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A banker is a fellow who lends you his umbrella
when the sun is shining,
but wants it back the minute it begins to rain.
Mark Twain
The market can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent.
John Maynard Keynes
Unless we understand what it is that leads to economic and financial
instability, we cannot prescribe – make policy – to modify or eliminate it.
Identifying a phenomenon is not enough; we need a theory that makes
instability a normal result in our economy and gives us handles to
control it.
Hyman Minsky
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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines economic uncertainty from various sources, and studies the
impact of uncertainty on the macroeconomy. In Chapter I, I theoretically investigate
uncertainty on asset returns and its role in financial fragility using a stylized model
where the level of uncertainty is endogenously chosen by banks. The risk behavior
of banks imposes a negative externality on the profitability of other banks because
liquidation of risky assets depresses asset prices in the secondary market. Combined
with limited liability, the model can give rise to a vicious feedback loop between
collective risk-taking behavior in the banking sector and fire sales of assets. The
model suggests that “panics” over fire sales of assets can initiate banks’ perverse risk-
taking incentives, and trigger a self-fulfilling financial crisis where banks are taking
risky investment, market liquidity is low, and credit risk is high.
In Chapter II, I study empirically the role of productivity uncertainty on firms’
investment in customer base. I find that similar to the case of physical capital invest-
ment, idiosyncratic uncertainty has a significant negative impact on customer base
investment. However, different from the case for physical capital investment, firms
with low customer base tend to be more sensitive to uncertainty. The empirical anal-
ysis suggests an alternative transmission mechanism for uncertainty shocks to the real
vi
economy that relies on the interaction between idiosyncratic uncertainty and product
market frictions.
In Chapter III, I focus on uncertainty about the monetary policy stance of the
central bank. I investigate the optimal monetary policy in a theoretical framework
where households are uncertain about central bank credibility. Contrary to the binary
“commitment vs. discretion” commitment setting, the central bank in this model is
able to commit to the optimal plan it formulates, but only over some finite (ran-
dom) horizons due to its temptation to renege on the plan. Given that central bank
credibility deteriorates with high inflation rates in the past, the central bank would
contemplate on the impact of inflation on its future credibility and social welfare, in
addition to the traditional inflation-output tradeoff. The main finding is that the cen-
tral bank would enhance its credibility directly through a more conservative inflation
policy.
vii
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1Chapter 1
Asset Fire Sales and Endogenous
Volatility
1.1 Introduction
The recent global financial crisis has rekindled the search of the origins of financial
fragility1. The collapse of the housing bubble in 2007 triggered a liquidity shortage
in the banking sector.2 Banks’ financial health deteriorated due to massive losses on
assets and withdrawals from short term creditors, which forced banks to liquidate
assets in fire sales.3 Along with the severe fire sales of assets, the economy also
experienced a widespread rise in the volatility of asset returns among non-financial
firms. Figure 1·1 documents the evolution of the time-varying volatility of bank’s
Return on Assets (ROA) and the TED spread4 in the US. The TED spread indicates
the difficulty of the banking sector in financing their long term investments and
thus can be used as a measure of credit risk in the banking sector. Both variables
surged significantly during the recent recession as well as the stock market crash in
1987. Moreover, their co-movement seems persistent throughout the past 30 years.
To account for these observations, I provide a theoretical explanation for financial
1Financial fragility refers to a financial system’s susceptibility to large-scale financial crises caused
by small, routine economic shocks ([6]Allen and Gale(2004) and [65]Lagunoff and Schreft(2001)).
2See [24]Brunnermeier(2009) for a detailed description.
3The term fire sale, coined by [83]Shleifer and Vishny(1992), is defined as a forced sale of an asset
at a dislocated price. See [82]Shleifer and Vishny(2011) and [46]French et al(2010).
4The TED spread is calculated as the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the 3-month
Treasury bill. It is collected from FRED.
2instability by highlighting the interaction between the financial health of the banking
sector and the volatility of asset returns.
The novel feature of the model is that the volatility of asset returns is endogenously
determined by banks’ risk taking behavior. The bank invests its funds in a project
that yield returns in the long run. The bank is able to choose risk on its long term
assets by investing in a specific project among a menu of projects differing in their
riskiness. A risky investment results in a high volatility in asset returns.
Figure 1·1: Co-movement of Volatility and Spread
The choice of risk poses a tradeoff for banks. On the one hand, subject to limited
liability, the bank can benefit from the option to default. On the other hand, the bank
incurs a cost for monitoring and collecting the risky returns5. Combining the two sides
of the trade-off, the incentive to risk shifting6 is negatively related to bank payoff. In
5as in [55]Holmstrom and Tirole(1997)
6The risk shifting behavior is an investment strategy that increases the probability of losses, if
it turns out badly, the creditors bear most of the costs, whereas if it turns out well, it gives the
shareholders most of the gains. See [57]Jensen and Meckling(1976)
3another word, bank chooses to gamble for resurrection when close to default.
As a widely studied subject in finance literature, the so-called gamble for resur-
rection phenomenon is shown to exist in real life ([41]Eisdorfer(2008)). For example,
it has been reported that the U.S. banks increases sales of insurance against credit
losses to holders of Greek, Portuguese, Irish, Spanish and Italian debt in the first half
of 2011, boosting the payoff by raising the risk of it.7 Another anecdotal evidence of
gamble for resurrection is that an ABN Amro executive claims that Royal Bank of
Scotland (RBS) got into trouble after its acquisition of the Dutch bank ABN Amro
because RBS, desperate for profit and capital, insisted ABN’s risky credit trading
positions be kept open and some be increased.8
I incorporate the bank’s choice of risk in a banking model9. Banks borrow from
depositors and invest in productive projects that yield returns in the long run. Banks
choose risk on their long term investments, expecting that some unknown fraction
of depositors will withdraw early. If they face a high demand for funds, banks are
forced to liquidate their long term assets prematurely in the secondary market at
some endogenous price for their assets.
Strategic complementarity arises in the model from the risk taking by banks. The
key mechanism is the following. When depositors demand liquidity, banks may have
to liquidate their long term assets in the secondary market. Due to limited risk
tolerance of asset buyers, liquidation of risky assets generates a downward pressure
on the secondary market price. A low secondary market price inhibits other banks’
capability of providing liquidity to their depositors, leading to a loss in their long
term profitability. Therefore, risk taking by banks imposes a negative externality on
the financial health and payoffs of other banks. According to the trade-off in the
7http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-01/selling-more-insurance-on-shaky-
european-debt-raises-risk-for-u-s-banks.
8The Economist (February 27, 2010), [36]Diamond and Rajan(2011)
9The framework of the model is borrowed from [36]Diamond and Rajan(2011).
4choice of risk, the bank has a stronger risk-taking incentive when its payoff is low.
Therefore, risk taking by some banks induces risk taking behaviors of other banks.
Because of the strategic complementarity of risk taking, the model can give rise to
multiple equilibria. There exists an equilibrium with low volatility in asset returns,
low default probability of banks, and a high secondary market price. The low volatil-
ity equilibrium represents the economy in normal times. However, expectations of fire
sales can trigger collective risk taking by banks, giving rise to a self-fulfilling financial
crisis. Thus, there potentially exists another equilibrium with high return volatility,
high credit risk and a low price in the secondary market. This riskier equilibrium
characterizes the economy in a financial crisis. A financial crisis happens when banks
expect fire sales in the future with impaired financial conditions. The events fol-
lowing the US crisis in 2008 in Iceland is a vivid example of such a crisis. As the
negative news on the US crisis unfurled, Icelandic banks adjusted their expectations
downward. Expecting troubles in the future, the banks administered their own po-
tent mix of systemic poison, causing the collapse of all three major banks in Iceland
([13]Baldursson and Portes(2013)).
The equilibrium with a self-fulfilling crisis generates welfare loss because banks
do not internalize their impact on asset prices or the default costs. Therefore, in the
second part of the paper I analyze how macro-prudential policies affect the financial
market efficiency in my setting. To be more specific, I extend the model by incor-
porating an ex-ante choice of cash holding and analyze the implication of a liquidity
requirement, according to which banks are required to hold certain amount of liquid
assets ex ante.
The model suggests that the effect of a liquidity requirement is ambiguous in
improving financial stability. When the secondary market price is low, banks are
holding liquid assets at a level which is lower than the social optimal level. Liquidity
5requirement could lower bank’s incentive to risk shifting by reducing the credit risk
and boosting bank payoffs, because it guarantees that banks are holding stronger
buffers against upcoming liquidity shocks. When the secondary market price is high,
liquidity holdings reduce long term payoffs, leading to a stronger risk shifting incen-
tive. It is because the liquidity requirement in this case restrains banks from making
long term investment. The cost of forfeited long term returns outweighs the benefit
from a stronger liquidity buffer. In sum, the liquidity requirement poses a tradeoff
between improving financial stability when fire sales are expected and encouraging
excessive risk taking otherwise.
There has been a growing consensus on the implementation of counter-cyclical
regulations in promoting the resilience of the financial system. In the context of the
model, the counter-cyclical liquidity requirement10 is shown to improve the tradeoff
imposed by the standard liquidity requirement and can promote financial stability.
The intuition is the following. According to the previous discussion, liquidity re-
quirement affects risk taking incentives differently according to the liquidation value
of assets. The cost of liquidity requirement is dampened during economic booms
because a high productivity could partially offset the risk taking incentives induced
by the higher liquidity requirement. Meanwhile, the cost of a liquidity requirement
is aggravated during economic downturns because low productivity intensifies bank
risk taking incentives further. Therefore, raising the requirement during booms and
lowering the requirement during bust can reduce risk taking and promote financial
stability.
To sum up, I build a model that connects financial health of banks with macroe-
conomic volatility. An expectation of fire sales can result in a self-fulfilling financial
crisis where the risk taking incentives and fire sales reinforce each other. The model
10A counter-cyclical liquidity requirement stipulates a higher requirement during economic upturns
and a lower requirement in economic downturns.
6suggests a room for counter-cyclical macro-prudential policy to improve financial sta-
bility.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses research related to the
paper. Section 3 studies the basic version of the model, followed by an analysis of
comparative statics. Section 4 extends the basic model by incorporating ex ante
choice of liquidity and studies the implication of a liquidity requirement. Section 5
concludes. The Appendix provides the proofs.
1.2 Literature Review
The paper connects with several lines of the literature: (i) financial fragility; (ii) risk
taking of banks; (iii) fire sales and (iv) time-varying volatility. I discuss how my paper
is related to each of the topics and the papers in the intersection of these topics.
First, this paper is related to the literature on the financial fragility. In the
seminal paper by [34]Diamond and Dybvig(1983), a financial system is susceptible
to a financial crisis with bank runs because of the mismatched maturities of bank
assets and liabilities. The inherent nature of banking results in the fragility of a
financial system stems from panics of depositors on the amount of withdrawals. 11
[65]Lagunoff and Schreft(2001) emphasize that financial fragility arises from direct
linkages of investor portfolios. The anticipation of withdrawals by investors would
cause others to change positions, generating a self-fulfilling crisis.
This paper points to the inherent nature of bank balance sheet structure as the
source of financial fragility as in [34]Diamond and Dybvig (1983). When depositors
demand funds, banks may be forced to liquidate their assets prematurely. Departing
11Along this line of work, [28]Chari and Jagannathan(1988) show that bank runs occur not only
when the economic outlook is poor but when liquidity needs are high as well. [5]Allen and Gale(1998)
develop a model where panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are
going to be unusually low. [72]Morris and Shin(2016) further study the panic-based bank run by
relating such panic with economic fundamentals under a global-game framework.
7from their paper, the demand for funds by depositors are exogenous in my model
whereas the liquidation value of asset is endogenously determined. A panic over asset
fire sales could potentially initiate a self-fulfilling crisis as it alters the risk taking
incentives of banks.
An interesting paper that also points to the endogenous liquidation value of assets
as a key in generating financial instability is [69]Malherbe(2014). He emphasizes the
negative externality of cash hoarding. With asymmetric information about project
qualities, cash hoarding triggers adverse selection in the secondary market, where
banks only liquidate lemon projects.12 In my paper, negative externality is originated
from another source, the risk taking of banks. The risk taking of banks depresses the
liquidation value of the assets, leading to a deteriorated financial health of banks.
The two papers have different implications on liquidity regulations. [69]Malherbe(2014)
renders the liquidity requirement counterproductive because of the negative external-
ity of cash hoarding. In my paper, the effect of a liquidity requirement is ambiguous.
The liquidity requirement encourages excessive risk taking by restraining banks’ long
term investments when the asset market is liquid. However, the liquidity requirement
can help improving financial stability when the asset market is illiquid by lowering
the credit risk of the banking sector.
Second, the paper is related to the literature on the risk taking of banks. Following
the seminal papers by [57]Jensen and Meckling(1976) (in a corporate finance context)
and [84]Stiglitz and Weiss(1981) (in a credit market equilibrium context), the risk-
shifting13 phenomenon has been intensively studied.14 [2]Acharya(2009) develops a
model that highlights a systemic risk-shifting incentive that is originated from bank
failures. When one bank fails, it exerts negative externality on others by raising
12[38]Dong, Miao and Wang(2016) considers the adverse selection mechanism in a dynamic general
equilibrium model and emphasizes that funding liquidity can erode market liquidity.
13Or underinvestment ([73]Myers(1977).
14See [19]Bhattacharya et al.(1998) and [45]Freixas and Rochet(2008) for surveys on risk shifting.
8the deposit rate. My paper differs from Acharya(2009) in two aspects. First, my
paper does not rely on the actual defaults for the existence of a systemic risk-shifting
incentive. Second, instead of choosing the correlation on their long term investments,
banks in my model choose the volatility on asset returns. From this perspective, my
paper complements Acharya(2009) by looking at the risk from another dimension,
with a focus on the volatility in returns.
The way I model the risk taking of banks is similar to [70]Martinez-Miera and
Repullo (2015), [79]Repullo(2004), and [74]Navarro(2015). However, the paper fo-
cuses on the study of financial instability, which stems from the bank’s expectation
of future liquidity shortages and its inability of funding its depositors.
In the empirical front, there are works confirming the existence of the risk shifting
incentives. [59]Kane(1989) and [31]Cole et al(1995) document the existence of gam-
bling for resurrection during the US S&L (saving and loans bank) crisis in the 1980s.
[39]Duran and Lozano-Vivas (2014) examine the risk shifting of US banks in 1998 -
2011. Their results suggest that banks engage in risk shifting most significantly with
non-depository creditors. [66]Landier, Sraer and Thesmar(2011) conduct an interest-
ing case study on the lending behavior of a large subprime mortgage originator - New
Century Financial Corporation and show that financial institutions in distress, may
take excessive risk. The incentive distortion effect of financial distress and gamble
for resurrection of banks are intensively studied in [42]Esty(1997), [47]Gan(2004) and
[44]Fischer et al(2011).
Third, the paper is related to the literature on fire sales15. In a seminal paper,
[61]Kiyotaki and Moore(1997) develop a macroeconomic model of credit cycles, which
is driven by self-reinforcing changes in asset values and collateralized borrowing con-
straints. Fire sales amplify initial adverse shock because it limits the productive
sector’s debt capacity. As assets flow to the less productive sector, it drives down
15See [82]Shleifer and Vishny(2011) for a survey on fire sales
9the value of asset further. 16 In light of the recent financial crisis, people have
been focusing on the deterioration of balance sheets of financial institutions and the
disruptions of the so-called bank lending channel ([17]Bernanke and Blinder(1988)).
[25]Brunnermeier and Pedersen(2009) model the simultaneous determination of se-
curity prices and margins. The endogenous variation of margin constraints is the
key in generating the vicious liquidity spiral. Papers exploring the macroeconomic
implications of disruptions in financial intermediations include [26]Brunnermeier and
Sannikov(2011), [48]Gertler and Karadi(2011), [49]Gertler and Kiyotaki(2009) and
[52]He and Krishnamurthy(2011).
Most papers in the literature studying the amplification mechanism of fire sales
by focusing on the financial decision of banks, i.e., lower net worth or debt overhang
problems ([76]Phillipon and Schnabl(2009)). Departing from the literature, this paper
explores a novel channel of fire sales by emphasizing the risk decisions of banks. In
this perspective, the paper is closely related to [36]Diamond and Rajan(2011). In
Diamond and Rajan(2011), anticipating a potential fire sale, banks prefer holding on
to their illiquid assets instead of liquidating them, raising the likelihood of insolvency.
Asset price will be further depressed when more are unloaded on the market. In
another word, distressed banks become illiquidity seekers. In my model, fire sales
increase the attractiveness of risky projects. Anticipating fire sales, banks become
risk seekers by taking projects that yield risky returns. Different from Diamond and
Rajan(2011), the spiral of fire sales in my model occurs even when banks are solvent.
Lastly, the paper is related to the literature on time-varying uncertainty. The
seminal paper by Bloom(2009) points out that the time varying volatility can under-
mine the real economy.17 Because of the detrimental effect of time-varying volatilities
16In [16]Bernanke and Gertler(1989) and [18]Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist(1998), shocks to firm
new worth reduce the ability of firms to borrow and undermine firm investments through financial
accelerator.
17A more recent work by [22]Bloom, Floetotto, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry(2012) quantifies the
10
on the real economy, it is worth exploring where the volatility comes from.
There is a growing line of work that studies endogenous volatilities. A semi-
nal paper on the study of endogenous volatility is [85]Veldkamp(2005) where un-
certainty is generated by learning about economic fundamentals.18 [10]Bachmann
and Bayer (2013) use a long panel of German firms and show that shocks to the
variance of firm-level TFP innovations, if any, only mildly amplify first-moment ag-
gregate shocks. The volatility in TFP is not an independent source of aggregate fluc-
tuations.19 [11]Bachmann and Moscarini(2012) explore the reverse causality where
negative first moment shocks induce risky behavior, leading to a rise in volatility in
economic outcomes.
Following this lead, I endogenize the volatility of asset returns by relating it with
the risk taking by banks. Establishing the link between the volatility and the financial
health of banks, the paper highlights the negative impact of volatility on the financial
system and the real economy.
1.3 The Model
There are three dates (t = 0, 1, 2). The model focuses on the choice of risk by banks
and incorporates a secondary market for the long term assets at date 1, in order to
study the simultaneous determination of fire sales and volatility of asset returns.
The main subject of study is bank. Banks invest in long term project and pro-
vide liquidity service to their depositors. However, the mechanism discussed in the
paper is not limited to the banking sector. It can be extended to non-financial cor-
porations with high leverage and significant maturity mismatch. Exposed to short
effect of uncertainty shocks in a DSGE model with heterogeneous firms. [50]Gilchrist, Sim and
Zakrajsek(2013) incorporate default risk in a model with firm investment and explore the interaction
between uncertainty shock and financial frictions.
18The mechanism has been extended in [75]Orlik and Veldkamp(2014).
19[12]Bachmann, Elstner and Sims(2010) form a more genuine measure of uncertainty and find
that the shocks to uncertainty have no discernible impact on the aggregate economic activity.
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term liabilities, agents are prone to financial distress, which induces their risk taking
incentives.
Figure 1·2: Time Line of the Model
The time-line can be summarized in Figure 1·2. The key elements in the timeline
are the following: at date 0, the bank makes long term investments using the funds
it attracts from depositors. The bank chooses the return risk on its long term assets
given the mean return of the assets. At date 1, when its depositors demand funds,
the bank needs to liquidate its long term assets in a secondary market to fulfill their
needs. At date 2, long term assets pays off. Given limited liability, the bank has the
option to default when its payoff is negative.
Long Term Assets Each bank invests in projects that yield returns at date 2.
The projects have mean return z, which is realized at date 0. Because the bank makes
decisions after the realization of z, in the basic model, z is treated as a parameter.
Given the mean return z, the long term project generates random returns z2 at date
2 according to
z2(θ, s; z) = (1 + sθ)z. (1.1)
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In this equation, s is an idiosyncratic productivity shock at date 2,
s =

1 with probability 1
2
,
−1 o.w.
(1.2)
θ represents the riskiness of returns. It is an endogenous choice of the bank. There is
a menu of projects available for banks. These projects have the same mean returns
but they differ in terms of riskiness. θ ∈ [0, θ¯]. For simplicity, I assume θ¯ = 1. The
bank chooses risk θ by investing in a specific project.
Banks There is a measure one of ex ante identical banks indexed by i. i ∈ [0, 1]. At
date 0, each bank attracts one unit of deposits from households and uses the funds
to invest in long term assets. In the basic model, banks cannot hold liquid assets ex
ante.20 The deposits are uninsured and generate return R∗ at date 2.21
Given the mean return of long term assets z, the bank chooses to take risk θ on its
portfolio. There is a cost of risk taking κ(θ) for each unit of return. Intuitively, the
cost can be interpreted as the resources spent for to monitor and collect the realized
returns. Assume that κ(θ) = cθ, where c < 1
2
. 22
At date 1, a common liquidity shock23 hits all banks with probability λ, in which
a fraction x of their depositors withdraw. x is the realization of a random variable
drawn from an uniform distribution on [0, 1]. x is private information to the bank
and it is not observable to its depositors.
20Later on, the paper allows banks to invest in liquid assets that yield risk free returns the next
period.
21In reality, deposits are insured or regulated in many countries. In the U.S, FDIC has been
created in 1933 to provide deposit insurance to depositors in US banks. Apart from commercial
banks that are FDIC-insured, there are other non-FDIC-insured financial corporations, such as
investment banks and funds, that finance their long term investments with short term debts. The
model is more relevant to this type of financial institutions.
22The assumption on c guarantees that the per unit return ex ante with risk is greater than the
return with no risk.
23The same type of shock has also been used in Diamond and Rajan(2011).
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Each bank needs to offer x liquid assets to satisfy the early withdrawals. At the
same time, the bank offers late depositors a return R∗ at date 2 so that they have no
incentive to withdraw at date 1.
In order to pay the early withdrawals, the bank has to liquidate its long term
assets in the secondary market at price p. p is the price facing all selling banks. In
the basic model without ex ante holding of liquid assets, p is also the market value
of bank assets at date 1. If p > x, the bank is fine. If p < x, the bank cannot cover
the withdrawals even by selling all long term assets. In this case, the bank is forced
to default. Let
ψ(p) = min{p, 1}. (1.3)
If a shock takes place, 1 − ψ(p) is the probability that a bank faces withdrawal x
greater than p. λ(1− ψ(p)) is the probability (in date 0) of default (in date 1). Call
it the ’illiquidity risk’ of the bank.
In this model, the instability of the financial system stems from the early with-
drawal shocks or more precisely, the expectation of the shock. In expectation of an
early withdrawal shock, the bank chooses risk θ to maximize its long term payoff. The
aggregate riskiness of asset returns determines the asset price in secondary market,
which in turn affects the risk decision of banks through its impact on the illiquidity
risk and the credit risk of the bank.
At date 2, the productivity shock s is realized. The long term assets pay off
accordingly. The ex post payoff of the bank is
y(θ, x, s; z) = (1− x
p
)(1− κ(θ))(1 + sθ)z − (1− x)R∗. (1.4)
With limited liability, a bank will default whenever its payoff is negative. When
default, the bank will get zero payoff.
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Depositors Each bank has a measure 1 of ex ante identical depositors. At date
1, with probability λ, x fraction of depositors become the early type, which need to
withdraw funds immediately. The return for early withdrawals is 1. (1−x) depositors
become the late types, who have no needs for funds at date 1.
The late type depositors have the option to withdraw fund together with the early
types and invest in safe and liquid assets which yield risk-free return r¯ at date 2. r¯
is exogenous. If the late types do not withdraw, they will get long term return R∗
at date 2 given that the bank does not default. Otherwise, they will get 0 when the
bank defaults.24 The mean return of long term asset is observable to the depositors.
But they cannot observe the size of the early withdrawals x or the risk behavior of
their individual banks. Given z, depositors would demand a long term rate R∗ such
that their expected return for not withdrawing is no less than their outside option r¯.
Secondary Market A secondary market for the long term assets is opened at
date 1. The liquidation value of an asset is endogenously determined in the market.
There are unlimited number of potential buyers for the assets. Buyers are risk neu-
tral. Furthermore, they have inferior ability to monitor and collect the risky returns
comparing with banks. They incur a higher monitoring cost τ (τ > c) when receiving
the risky returns.
It will be shown later that the bank’s choice of risk takes a corner solution, θ ∈
{0, 1}. Therefore the assets sold in the secondary market would yield either highly
risky returns or riskless returns. There is asymmetric information between buyers
and banks. Buyers cannot observe the risk associated with a specific asset. They
know only the distribution of risky assets in the market. Denote nB the fraction of
risky assets the buyers expect in the market. With private information, the expected
24In the appendix, I relax this assumption. In stead of zero payoff when default, depositors can get
a fraction of the gross return of the bank. Relaxing this assumption does not generate qualitatively
different results.
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value of an asset depends on the fraction of risky assets in the market25
Therefore the market price p for the valuation of asset is given by
p(nB, z) =
z
r¯
(
nB(1− τ) + (1− nB)) . (1.5)
This section focuses on the basic version of the model. Later on, the model
incorporates an ex ante choice of liquidity and capital respectively. The extensions of
the model not only provides a more complete picture of the behavior of banks but it
could generate more room for policy analysis as well.
1.3.1 Bank’s Choice of Risk
The key decision the bank has to make is the choice of risk, which takes place at date
0. At date 0, the aggregate return on long term assets z is realized. Banks are risk
neutral and only care about the expected payoff at date 2. Given z, the bank chooses
risk θ to maximize its expected payoff:
max
θ∈[0,1]
U0(θ; z) (1.6)
The expected payoff of the bank
U0(θ; z) = ExEs max{y(θ, x, s; z), 0},
where y is the ex post payoff defined in Equation 1.4.
Assumption 1 c < 1
3
.
The assumption implies that the cost of taking risk is not high enough to discour-
age banks from taking risk regardless of z.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, for any value of z, θ = 0 or 1.
25See [4]Akerlof(1970).
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The proof is in the appendix. The intuition is the following. The bank faces a
trade-off in the choice of risk. On one side, the bank incur a cost for taking risk. The
cost is proportional to the asset returns. On the other side, by taking risk, the bank
can benefit from risk shifting, in terms of both higher expected payoffs given x and
higher probability of no default. The expected payoff first decreases then increases in
θ.
The marginal payoff in risk is negative for θ sufficiently low. When a bank chooses
low θ, the bank can receive payoffs in both positive and negative productivity shocks
at date 2. Additional risk does not generate a high enough variation in the bank’s
survival probability between positive and negative productivity shocks. The marginal
benefit from risk shifting is small. Meanwhile, the marginal cost of risk is κ′(θ)z per
unit of asset, outweighing the marginal benefit.
The marginal payoff in risk becomes positive for θ high enough. As the variation
in asset returns expands with θ, the bank generates payoffs only with positive pro-
ductivity shock and always defaults in negative shocks. Additional risk yields return
net of cost (1− κ(θ))z per unit of assets and costs κ′(θ)(1 + θ)z. Under assumption
1, the marginal payoff in risk is positive for θ high enough.26 The survival probability
(in positive shocks) also rises when taking risk for p < 1. In this case, the expected
payoff is increasing in θ.
Combining the two cases, the optimal choice of risk takes corner solutions, θ ∈
{0, 1}.
PROPOSITION 1 (Optimal Choice of Risk) Given the price of long term
asset in the secondary market p and equilibrium long term deposit rate R∗, there exists
26The linearity in κ(θ) is not essential. The result can be extended to κ = cθα, in which case the
assumption on c is c < 12α+1 .
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a threshold z∗(p,R∗) such that
θ(p,R∗, z) =
1 if z < z∗(p,R∗)0 if z ≥ z∗(p,R∗).
The threshold z∗(p,R∗) is the following:
z∗(p,R∗) = α(p)R∗ (1.7)
where α(p) is a function of secondary market price p and model parameters.
Proof: (In the Appendix).
The cost and benefit of risk taking differ according to different levels of z. Figure
1·3 illustrates the intuition graphically. Without the cost of risk taking, risk taking
is always preferred, as shown in the red dotted line. The bank obtains returns only
in positive shocks when taking risk θ = 1, so the benefit of risk taking comes from
the higher survival probability (in positive shocks) and a lower expected repayment
to late depositors.
The cost of risk taking is proportional to the returns on the long term assets.
Higher mean return entails a higher cost of risk taking, as shown in the red solid line.
After taking into account the cost, there exists a maximum mean return z∗, beyond
which the bank prefer no risk in returns.
Because the bank’s expected payoffs with and without risk are both homogenous
of degree one in their arguments, an increase in R∗ leads to an one-to-one increase in
the threshold return z∗. The multiple α(p) is the ratio of return required to induce
stable returns and the borrowing cost R∗. Intuitively, it is the liquidity premium the
bank demands for exposing itself to liquidity shocks while not taking risk.
18
Figure 1·3: Threshold z∗
PROPOSITION 2: α(p) is increasing in p for p < p˜ and decreasing in p for
p ≤ p˜, where p˜ < 1 and satisfies that
(1− c)xH(p˜, 1, α(p˜))2 = xL(p˜, 1, α(p˜))2, (1.8)
where xH and xL are the maximum sizes of early withdrawals that would not induce
a default at date 2, when the bank take high risk (H) and no risk (L),
xH(p,R∗, z) =
z − R∗
2(1−c)
z
p
− R∗
2(1−c)
(1.9)
and
xL(p,R∗, z) =
z −R∗
z
p
−R∗ . (1.10)
Proof: (In the Appendix).
α(p) is non-monotonic in p. It first increases and then decreases in p. The intuition
is the following. For p sufficiently low, i.e., p < p˜, the secondary market is almost
completely illiquid. Regardless of the choice of risk, the bank cannot sell long term
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assets for liquidity and is forced to default when hit by a liquidity shock. The bank can
only generate positive payoffs when facing no early withdrawals. Without liquidity
shocks, the bank has less incentive to take risk. Thus a lower p decreases the risk
taking incentive.
For p high enough, the expected payoff given a liquidity shock increases with p.
As p rises, the bank is further away from its default region, the risk shifting incentive
diminishes. The direct effect becomes negative.
Figure 1·4 and 1·5 show the intuition graphically. A low market price p limits
the bank’s ability to withstand liquidity shocks, driving down its expected payoffs
regardless of the choice of risk. The effect of p on the threshold z∗ depends on how
p changes the bank payoffs with and without risk. The responses of the expected
payoffs depend on the survival probabilities and the cost of risk taking.
For p sufficiently low, the survival probability with risk taking (xH) is significantly
higher than with no risk (xL). Thus the expected payoff with risk is more sensitive
to changes in p. A decrease in p would depress the expected payoff with risk by
more, leading to a lower risk shifting incentives.z∗ falls as p falls. The direct effect is
positive. See Figure 1·4.
As p rises, the survival probabilities both increase and the cost of risk taking starts
to play a larger role by dampen the response of payoff with risk. The expected payoff
without risk is more sensitive to changes in asset price. A decrease in secondary
market price depresses the payoff without risk by more, leading to a higher risk
shifting incentives. z∗ rises as p falls. See Figure 1·5.
1.3.2 The Determination of R∗
At date 1, observing the mean return on long term assets z and the secondary market
price p, depositors form the probability of no default, taking into account the optimal
choice of risk by banks and the expectation on x. The probability of no default from
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Figure 1·4: Change in z∗ for a Decrease in p when p is low
Figure 1·5: Change in z∗ for a Decrease in p when p is high
depositor’s perspective γd is given by:
γd(p,R∗, z) =

Pr(y(1, x, s; z) > 0) if z > z∗(p,R∗)
Pr(y(0, x, s; z) > 0) o.w
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For p ≤ 1, banks can survive date 1 as long as the liquidity shock x is below the
market value of bank asset, p. Banks can survive date 2 as long as their payoffs are
high enough to cover the repayment to late depositors.
γd(p,R∗, z) =

0 if z < R
∗
2(1−c)
1
2
(λxH(p,R
∗, z) + (1− λ)) if z ∈ [ R∗
2(1−c) , z
∗(p,R∗)]
λxL(p,R
∗, z) + (1− λ) o.w,
where xH and xL are defined in Equation 1.9 and 1.10 above.
For p > 1, the market value of bank asset is large enough to withstand liquidity
shocks. Banks can always survive date 1. The bank will not default at date 2 as long
as z is large enough.
γd(p,R∗, z) =

1
2
λ (1− xH(p,R∗, z)) if z < R∗2(1−c)
1
2
if z ∈ [ R∗
2(1−c) , z
∗(p,R∗)]
1 o.w.
.
Given the assumption that depositors will get nothing when bank defaults, the
expected return for late depositors when they do not withdraw is R∗γd(p,R∗, z). They
demand deposit rate R∗ such that their expected returns for not withdrawing at date
1 are no less than their outside option of investing in risk-less short term bonds with
return r¯, i.e.,
R∗γd(p,R∗, z) ≥ r¯. (1.11)
In order to convince the depositors not to withdraw early, the bank has to offer a long
term return R∗ such that the participation constraint (Equation 1.11) above hold in
equality.
Assumption 2 (1− λ)(1− c)z > r¯.
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PROPOSITION 3 (The Existence of R∗) Under Assumption 2, given the
secondary market price p and mean return z, the equilibrium deposit rate R∗(p, z)
always exists for p ≥ 0.
Proof: (in the Appendix).
The proof is by the Intermediate Value Theorem. When banks offer a riskless
rate, R∗ = r¯, because of the non-negative probability of default, the expected return
for late depositors will always be less preferable than their outside option. When
banks offer R∗ = 2(1− c)z, the deposit rate is sufficiently large such that the banking
sector always want to take risk in this case. By Assumption 2, the expected return of
depositors when they do not withdraw at date 1 exceeds r¯. To satisfy equation 1.11,
there exists a unique equilibrium deposit rate R∗ ∈ [1, 2(1− c)z].
Note that there can be more than one R∗ satisfying Equation 1.11. It means that
the fear of a rise in the default risk can lead to a higher borrowing cost for banks
and feed back to a higher default probability, i.e.,a self-fulfilling default.27 I eliminate
the possibility of such a self-fulfilling crisis by assuming that banks and depositors
can coordinate to the equilibrium with low deposit rate R∗. The multiplicity of
equilibrium in this paper arises solely from the expectation over liquidation value of
assets by banks.
Lemma 2 R∗(p, z) is decreasing in p.
Proof: (in the Appendix).
Secondary market price p indicates the difficulty in raising liquid assets by selling
long term assets. It is linked to the notion of market liquidity as in [24]Brunnermeier
and Pedersen(2009). R∗ is the borrowing cost the banks have to offer to their depos-
itors. It reflects the bank’s difficulty in financing its investment, or funding liquidity
27This is in line with [30]Cole and Kehoe(1998).
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in [24]Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
The model suggests that in the presence of a liquidity shock, the secondary market
illiquidity deteriorates the funding liquidity for banks by lifting up the credit risk.
The mutual reinforcement between market liquidity and funding liquidity has been
discussed in papers such as [35]Diamond and Rajan (2005), [25]Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009), [63]Krishnamurthy (2010) and [3]Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer
(2011), [54]He and Xiong (2012) and [53]He and Milbradt (2014).
1.3.3 Impact of p on Bank’s Risk Taking
With long term deposit rate R∗ endogenously determined, the effect of the secondary
market price p on the threshold in risk taking decision z∗ can be decomposed into
two parts:
∂z∗/z∗
∂p/p
=
∂α
∂p
p
α︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct Effect
+
∂R∗
∂p
p
R∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect Effect
. (1.12)
The secondary market price of the long term asset affects the choice of risk for
banks through two effects. The first term summarizes the direct effect of p while
keeping R∗ fixed. Call this the direct effect. It reflects the change in the required
liquidity premium to convince a bank not to take risk. As shown perviously, when
p declines, the bank can withstand less liquidity shocks. It needs a higher return to
compensate its exposure to the liquidity shock. That is , α(p) falls as p declines.
Unless p is sufficiently low, in which case, the bank does not need a high liquidity
premium to take risk because its payoff in liquidity shocks becomes negligible.
The second term summarizes the indirect effect of secondary market p on z∗.
The channel is through the impact of p on the equilibrium long term deposit rate
R∗.The indirect effect is always negative. A low p heightens the default probability
of the bank and the depositors demand a higher return, R∗. The higher deposit rate
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drives down the bank’s payoff with and without liquidity shock equally. Banks are
unambiguously more likely to take high risk. z∗ rises as a result.
The total effect of secondary market price on the optimal risk taking of the bank
is the sum of the two effects. When p is high enough, both direct and indirect effects
are negative. p encourages banks to take risk unambiguously. Immediately, we have
the following result:
PROPOSITION 4 For p > 1 , both the direct and the indirect effects are nega-
tive, the total effect
∂z∗/z∗
∂p/p
< 0. (1.13)
When price is high, the secondary market is liquid. Banks have no difficulty paying
the early withdrawals. There is no liquidity-induced default at date 1. In this case,
the choice of risk is not sensitive to changes in the secondary market price. First, the
size of the direct effect is small, i.e.,
|∂α/α
∂p/p
| = λ
2p− λ ≤ 1.
Second, the size of the indirect effect is zero because R∗ is either 1 or 2 for p > 1. R∗
is insensitive to changes in p.
∂R∗
∂p
= 0.
In sum, the total effect of p on z∗ is negative and
∂z∗/z∗
∂p/p
=
∂α
∂p
p
α
. (1.14)
As p rises further, it has less impact on the bank’s expected payoff or choice of
risk. The total effect becomes increasingly small.
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Figure 1·6: Threshold in the choice of risk, z∗
For p ≤ 1, the two effects have opposite signs for sufficiently low p. The total
effect depends on which effect is dominant. Figure 1·6 illustrates separately the two
effects of p on z∗. The left panel depicts the direct effect by fixing R∗ = 1. The right
panel illustrates the evolution of R∗ given the mean return z. The numerical example
suggests that the indirect effect is the driving force of the risk taking behaviors of
banks. I formalize the discussion in the following:
Assumption 3 (1− c)(1− λ)z > 1
1−D(c) where
D(c) = 2c
(
(1− c)( 1
2c
− 1
2(1− c))
2 − ( 1
2c
− 1)2
)
.
PROPOSITION 5 For p ≤ 1 , (i) under Assumption 3, the size of indirect
effect always dominates that of the direct effect for p < p˜,
|∂R
∗/R∗
∂p/p
| > ∂α/α
∂p/p
> 0;
(ii) both indirect and direct effects are negative for p ∈ [p˜, 1]; (iii) the total effect
∂z∗(p)/z∗(p)
∂p/p
< 0. (1.15)
for p ≤ 1.
Proof is in the Appendix.
When p is sufficiently low, the two effects are of opposite signs. First, the size of
the direct effect is small. The intuition is for sufficiently low p, the bank’s payoff in
liquidity shock is negligible while given R∗, its payoff with no liquidity shocks is not
affected by p. As a result, the secondary market price p does not alter the choice of
risk by much.
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In comparison, the size of the indirect effect is relatively large. The equilibrium
R∗ is relatively more sensitive to changes in p, due to the mutual reinforcement of
market liquidity and funding liquidity. To see this point clearly, the indirect effect
can be further decomposed by differentiating Equation 1.11
∂R∗/R∗
∂p/p
= − 1
1 + ∂γ
d/γd
∂R∗/R∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
multiplier
∂γd/γd
∂p/p
. (1.16)
The second term in Equation 1.16 reflects the price elasticity on the survival prob-
ability of the bank. Under Assumption 3, it can be shown that the survival probability
is more elastic in its response to p comparing with the requirement liquidity premium
α,
∂γd/γd
∂p/p
> |∂α/α
∂p/p
|.28 (1.17)
The first term in Equation 1.16 links the price elasticity of the survival probability
with that of the deposit rate. Because29
0 < 1 +
∂γd/γd
∂R∗/R∗
≤ 1, (1.18)
it acts as a multiplier that magnifies the response of the deposit rate to p after the
initial response of the survival probability.
Combining the two inequalities,
|∂R
∗/R∗
∂p/p
| ≥ ∂γ
d/γd
∂p/p
> |∂α/α
∂p/p
|, (1.19)
the dominance of the indirect effect can be established.
The dominance of the indirect effect is because market illiquidity erodes funding
28The proof is in the appendix
29The Equation 1.18 holds because a) a high R∗ dwindles the survival probability of the bank,
∂γ0
∂R∗ < 0; and b) the depositors’ expected return for not withdrawing is increasing when the deposit
rate is at the equilibrium level, ∂γ0∂R∗ > −1.
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liquidity. As p falls, the bank entails a higher credit risk. Depositors demand a
higher R∗ as a compensation for taking higher risks. The first round of response of
R∗ is ∂γ
d/γd
∂p/p
. The higher borrowing cost pushes the bank closer to its default region,
inducing more risk taking and driving up the credit risk further. R∗ rises as a second
round effect. The size of the second round response is | ∂γd/γd
∂R∗/R∗ |∂γ
d/γd
∂p/p
.
The process goes on until the deposit rate R∗ reaches the market equilibrium. The
total impact of p on R∗ :
|∂R
∗/R∗
∂p/p
| = ∂γ
d/γd
∂p/p
(
1 + | ∂γ
d/γd
∂R∗/R∗
|+ | ∂γ
d/γd
∂R∗/R∗
|2 + ...). (1.20)
Combining the two cases with different levels of the secondary market price, im-
mediately we have the following result for the optimal risk-taking behavior for banks.
Lemma 3 z∗(p, z) is decreasing in p and z.
A low secondary market price intensifies the risk shifting incentives and induces
the bank to take more risk. A rise in the mean return on the long term asset reduces
the credit risk and the deposit rate, leading to a lower threshold z∗.
1.3.4 The Aggregate Choice of Risk
Let pˆ(z) satisfy that
z∗(pˆ, R∗(pˆ, z)) = z. (1.21)
pˆ(z) is the minimum secondary market price at which the bank starts to prefer no
risk. The optimal choice of risk for individual bank can be rewritten as
θ(p, z) =

1 if p < pˆ(z)
0 if p ≥ pˆ(z).
The bank chooses risky returns when p is sufficiently low.
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Because of the monotonicity of z∗ in p and z, pˆ(z) is decreasing in z. The bank
has higher incentives to take risk for a low mean return z. Thus a high cutoff price
is required in order to convince the bank not to take risk.
Denote n the fraction of banks that take risks in their long term investments.
Given p, the aggregate risk-taking behavior of the banking sector is
n(p, z) =

1 if p < pˆ(z)
[0, 1] if p = pˆ(z)
0 if p > pˆ(z).
(1.22)
The banking sector collectively take risk in long term assets when the secondary
market price is lower than the cutoff price.
1.3.5 the Market Value for the Illiquid Asset
The secondary market provides banks means to convert long term assets into liquidity.
Buyers are risk neutral and they incur a higher monitoring cost for holding risky
returns. Riskiness of assets is private information to banks and buyers can only
observe the distribution of risky assets in the market. With nB probability, the buyer
expects to obtain an asset with risky returns, which is valued at its expected return
net of a monitoring cost τ . So the valuation of the assets to the buyers is given by
Equation 1.5.
More specifically, when no banks take risk, p(0, z) = z
r¯
. The price is the present
value of the mean return. When all banks take risk, p(1, z) = z
r¯
(1 − τ). Buyers
discount the present value by τ .
The equilibrium is a fixed point problem where p(n(p, z), z) = p, where n is the
aggregate risk-taking behavior of the banking sector.
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Figure 1·7: Market Equilibrium
1.3.6 Characterization of the Equilibrium
Definition of the equilibrium: The rational expectation equilibrium is defined
by (θ∗, n∗, R∗, p∗) such that
a) θ∗ is the optimal choice of risk given the secondary market price p∗ and equi-
librium long term deposit rate R∗.
b) n∗ is the proportion of banks that take risk given p∗ and R∗.
c) R∗ is the equilibrium long term deposit rate satisfying depositors participation
constraint given p∗.
d) p∗ is the valuation of long term asset by the buyers in the secondary market.
The model could generate multiple equilibria. Figure 1·7 illustrates an example of
that. The equilibrium outcome depends on the expectation on the secondary market
price.
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In expectation of a high price in the secondary market, banks have less concerns
of liquidation and fire sales. With high expected payoffs, banks have less incentives
to take risk in long term investments. The volatility of asset returns is low and the
price in the secondary market is consistent with the initial expectation. In this case,
the economy reaches the low volatility equilibrium.
On the contrary, when high fire sales in the secondary market are expected, banks
have difficulty in paying for their early withdrawals. Close to the default region, banks
have more incentives to take risk to boost their payoffs. Consequently, the credit risk
rises, inducing more banks to take risk. In equilibrium, the whole banking sector
takes high risk for their long term investments. With the returns more volatile, the
asset price in the secondary market is indeed low. It is the high volatility equilibrium.
Both equilibria are locally stable. Any perturbation to the equilibrium price will
not persist. The equilibrium at p = pˆ is unstable.
Multiple equilibria exist in this model because of the strategic complementarity
generated by the risk-taking behavior of banks. When banks choose risk for their
portfolios, they do not take into account the downward pressure they exert on the
asset price in the secondary market. A low price in the secondary market in turn
depresses payoffs of other banks. As a response to lower payoffs, other banks are
encouraged to take risk. Negative externalities of the risk-taking behavior of banks
give rise to a systemic incentive to take risk. As a result, the long term assets in the
economy may end up with highly volatile returns.
PROPOSITION 6 (Existence of Multiple Equilibria) Given the mean
aggregate return z, (i) The low volatility equilibrium exists when pˆ(z) ≤ p(0, z); (ii)
The high volatility equilibrium exists when pˆ(z) ≥ p(1, z); (iii) Multiple equilibria
exists when (i) and (ii) hold simultaneously.
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The low volatility equilibrium exists when the buyers value the assets with risk-less
returns high enough to convince the banking sector not to take risk. Meanwhile, the
high volatility equilibrium exists when the buyers value the risky assets low enough
to encourage collective risk taking of the whole banking sector.
When the social planner takes the payoffs of both depositors and banks into con-
sideration, in the presence of multiple equilibria, the low volatility equilibrium is more
efficient than the high volatility equilibrium. The reason is that while the depositors
expected payoff are equal in both equilibria30, the bank’s payoff is always higher in
the low volatility equilibrium.31
1.3.7 Comparative Statics
This subsection studies how the aggregate productivity z, the probability of a liquidity
shock λ and the cost of taking risk c affect equilibrium outcomes.
Aggregate Productivity z
Aggregate productivity boosts long term payoffs of banks and weakens their incentive
to take risk. In the presence of a high z, a large fire sale discount in the secondary mar-
ket price is needed to convince the banking sector to take risk. As shown previously,
pˆ(z) is decreasing in z.
Let zG denote the threshold productivity which satisfies that
pˆ(z) = p(0, z). (1.23)
Because pˆ(z) is decreasing in z, the condition for the existence of the good equilibrium
30This is followed by the depositors participation constraint.
31It can be shown that
U0(1; z)|p=p(1,z) ≤ U0(1; z)|p=pˆ(z) = U0(0; z)|p=pˆ(z) ≤ U0(0; z)|p=p(0,z).
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Figure 1·8: Threshold pˆ as a function of z
(with low volatility ) is equivalent to z > zG.
Similarly, let zB denote the threshold productivity such that
pˆ(z) = p(1, z). (1.24)
The condition for the bad equilibrium (with high volatility) is equivalent to z < zB.
Note that zG < zB. Multiple equilibria exists when z ∈ [zG, zB]. In this range,
expectations can be self-fulfilling. See Figure 1·8.
The effect of aggregate productivity on risk taking decision by banks works through
two channels. Given R∗, a low mean return z encourages banks to take advantage of
the limited liability to boost payoffs. More banks take risk. Expecting this, depositors
demand higher rate R∗ to compensate for the default risk, which intensifies the risk-
shifting incentive further. pˆ rises as z falls. A wider range of secondary market price
is admissible for the systemic risk-taking behavior of the banking sector. The high
volatility equilibrium becomes more likely. When the mean return z is sufficiently
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Figure 1·9: Threshold pˆ with Changes in c
low, the economy can potentially be trapped in the inefficient equilibrium with severe
fire sale discounts and high volatility in asset returns. The Figure 1·8 illustrates the
domain of z for multiple equilibria in a numerical example with given c and λ.
Changes in c
c denotes the cost of taking high risk, i.e., c = κ(1). An increase in c means banks
incur higher costs when taking risky investments. The threshold pˆ is decreasing in
c. The intuition is the following. For given R∗, the bank’s payoff without taking risk
is not affected. Meanwhile, the payoff with risk-taking falls. As it becomes costly to
take risky investments, the bank is less willing to do so. In equilibrium, depositors
expect less defaults and demand a lower deposit rate. The incentive to take risk falls
even further. As c rises, a lower secondary market price is needed to convince the
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Figure 1·10: Threshold pˆ with Changes in λ
whole banking sector to take risk. The left panel in Figure 1·9 depicts the cutoff price
pˆ with a change in c. As c rises, both boundary conditions for the good and bad
equilibria (zG and zB) decreases. With a given λ, the right panel illustrates the two
boundary conditions zG and zB in c. In between is the region for multiple equilibria.
Because c reduces risk-taking incentive, as c rises, the good equilibrium becomes more
likely and the bad equilibrium becomes less likely.
Changes in λ
λ is the probability that a liquidity shock hits the banking sector at date 1. The effect
of λ on the expected payoffs of banks is twofold. On the one hand, a high λ depresses
the bank payoffs because with the rising needs for early withdrawals, the banks are
more likely to sell assets for liquidity. On the other hand, a high λ improves the bank
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payoffs because as more depositors are expected to withdraw early, less repayment is
needed in the long term.
The total effect of λ on the risk decisions of banks depends on the secondary
market price. For p > 1, the bank can always withstand liquidity shocks at date
1. The second effect dominates. The expected payoffs increase in λ because banks
expect lower total repayments to the late depositors at date 2. Therefore a high λ
discourages risk-taking behavior. As banks expect a higher probability of liquidity
shocks, they would not take risk unless the secondary market price is low enough, i.e.
pˆ falls.
For p ≤ 1, with an less liquid secondary market, banks become more concerned
over the forced fire sales. The first effect dominates. A high λ lowers bank payoffs
and encourages risk taking. Meanwhile, since defaults become more likely, depositors
demand a higher R∗. Banks are pushed even closer to their default region, intensifying
their incentives to take risk. pˆ increases with λ. A wider range of secondary market
prices is admissible for the existence of the high volatility equilibrium.
The left panel in Figure 1·10 illustrates the cutoff price pˆ in z. λ affects pˆ differently
depending on the secondary market price. As discussed above, an increase in λ reduces
risk-taking when p is high. pˆ decreases, rendering the good equilibrium more likely.
On the contrary, it encourages risk-taking when p is low. pˆ increases, raising the
likelihood of the bad equilibrium. The right panel illustrates the boundary conditions
for the good and bad equilibria. An increase in the liquidity shock probability λ raises
the likelihood for both equilibria, leading to an expansion of the region for multiple
equilibria.
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Figure 1·11: Time-line with Ex Ante Choice of Liquidity
1.4 The Model with Ex Ante Liquidity
This section studies an extended version of the model by incorporating an ex ante
choice of liquid asset holding. That means, at date 0, the bank can invest in a safe
and perfectly liquid asset, which generates return 1 from date 0 to date 1. Now,
banks are making two decisions at date 0: given mean return z, banks choose both
the quantity and the risk of their long term investments.32
With the additional choice of liquidity holding, the time line in the extended model
is illustrated in Figure 1·11.
When the bank is subject to liquidity shocks, it is natural to discuss bank’s prob-
lem where the bank has the option to hold liquid assets ex ante as a precautionary
buffer. Incorporating the ex ante choice of liquidity also provides more room for the
discussion of some maco-prudential policies.
The effect of liquidity holding on the choice of risk is twofold. On one hand, the
holding of liquidity prevents long term assets from liquidating so it boosts long term
payoffs of banks, which lower their risk-shifting incentives. On the other hand, when
the bank hoards liquidity in stead of engaging in long term investments, the bank
payoff is negatively affected. Consequently, the bank tends to take more risk. Which
32The choice of liquid asset holding can happen before the mean return z. In this case, assuming
that z is drawn from a distribution F (z) on [z, z¯]. This setting means that the bank commits certain
funds to some long term projects and then chooses the risk associated with the project given the
realization of z. The timing here does not alter the results significantly.
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effect dominates will depend on the relative strengths of the cost and the benefit of
holding liquidity. The model suggests that the total effect of liquid asset holding on
the risk taking by banks is non-monotonic. It will depend on the secondary market
price.
1.4.1 Bank’s Problem
Now banks have two decisions to make. Given an aggregate mean return z, banks
decide how much liquidity to hold and the riskiness on their long term assets simul-
taneously:
max
l,θ∈[0,1]
U0(l, θ; z). (1.25)
U0 is the expected payoff of the bank,
U0(l, θ; z) = ExEs max{y(l, θ, x, s; z), 0}, (1.26)
where the ex post payoff
y(l, θ, x, s; z) =

(1− l)(1 + sθ)(1− κ(θ))z + (l − x)r¯ − (1− x)R∗ if x < l
(1− l − x−l
p
)(1 + sθ)(1− κ(θ))z − (1− x)R∗ o.w.
In order to fulfill the liquidity needs, the bank liquidates its long term asset after it
exhausts its liquidity buffer l.
Choice of Risk
I first solve for the choice of risk by banks for given liquidity holding l and then solve
for the optimal liquidity holding. Similar to the previous analysis, the optimal choice
of risk would take corner solutions, i.e., θ ∈ {0, 1}.
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PROPOSITION 7 (Choice of Risk) Given mean return z and the choice of
liquidity l, bank chooses riskiness of its long term assets θ according to
θ(l, p, R∗, z) =
1 if z < z∗(l, p, R∗)0 if z ≥ z∗(l, p, R∗) (1.27)
where z∗(l, p, R∗) is the threshold mean return that equates the expected payoffs with
and without risk,
U0(l, 1; z) = U0(l, 0; z). (1.28)
Because the expression for z∗(l, p, R∗) is complicated to compute, there is no
closed-form solution for z∗. However, we can discuss the evolution of z∗ in its argu-
ments.
Lemma 4 z∗(l, p, R∗) is increasing in l for small enough λ.
The proof is in the Appendix.
The lemma suggests that the choice of risk and quantity for long term investments
are substitutes. When the bank holds more liquid assets, less is invested in long term
projects. In order to boost payoff, the bank takes more risk.
In general the total effect of individual liquidity holding l on bank payoffs and
z∗ will depend on the secondary market price. For secondary market price p >
1, z∗(l, p, R∗) is increasing in l unambiguously. Holding liquidity depresses payoffs
because the cost from the forfeited returns on long term investments exceeds the
benefit of holding a stronger liquidity buffer. With the cost of taking risk c, the
expected return on long term investment per unit of fund is c fraction lower for
banks that take risk. So the expected payoff without risk falls by more for a given
incremental increase in liquidity holding. As a result, liquidity holding induces risk
taking behavior.
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For secondary market price p ≤ 1, the monotonicity of z∗ in l may not hold in
general. Holding one unit of additional liquidity saves more than one unit (1
p
≥ 1)
of assets from liquidation. The gain of holding liquidity can potentially outweigh
the cost. The expected payoffs given positive liquidity shocks with and without risk
can potentially be increasing in liquidity holding, in which case the payoff without
risk taking improves by more for a given incremental increase in l. Banks will be
discouraged to take more risk unless λ is small enough. For sufficiently small λ, banks
put more weight on the expected payoffs conditional on no liquidity shocks, where
the concern for not able to withstand liquidity shocks is less significant comparing
with the loss from forfeited return. Similar to the case where p > 1, holding liquidity
adversely affects the expected payoffs and the expected payoffs without risk taking
responds by more. Again, the increasing property of z∗ in l holds. Liquidity holding
facilitates risk taking behavior.
Choice of Liquidity
Given the realization of z and its optimal choice of risk in Equation 1.27, the bank
chooses optimal liquidity l to optimize its expected payoff,
max
l∈[0,1]
U0(l, θ
∗; z). (1.29)
PROPOSITION 8 (Optimal Liquidity Holding) For λ sufficiently small,
l∗ = 0 for all z and p.
The proof is in the appendix. Under some conditions for λ, the bank has no
incentive to hold liquid assets ex ante regardless of the secondary market liquidity.
The intuition is the following. At date 0, banks weigh the tradeoff in holding liquid
assets. Given the realization of z, additional liquid asset holding is beneficial as it
prevents 1
p
long term assets from liquidation. On the other hand, liquidity holding
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incur a cost since the bank has to give up returns from long term assets as long as
it does not default. In a liquid secondary market with p > 1, the cost of liquidity
holding always exceeds the benefit for all realizations of z. It is optimal not to hold
any liquidity ex ante.
In an illiquid secondary market with p ≤ 1, holding additional liquidity saves
more than one unit (1
p
≥ 1) of assets from liquidation. The gain from holding a
stronger liquidity buffer can potentially outweigh the cost. Moreover, as p falls, it
becomes increasingly difficult to sell long term assets for liquidity. Banks benefit more
from holding liquid assets ex ante. Banks prefer holding non-zero liquidity when p is
sufficiently low.
For λ sufficiently small, the ex ante illiquidity risk is small. That is, the bank is
very likely to survive date 1. In this case, the bank has no incentive to hold liquid
assets ex ante even for a low p. Therefore, the extended version of the problem
coincides with the basic model.
1.4.2 The Determination of R∗
Same as in the basic model, depositors observe the realized mean return z and the
asset price in the secondary market p. They cannot observe the decisions (on liquid
assets holding or risk taking) made by their individual banks. Nor can they observe
the size of the liquidity shock x. They form the probability of no default, taking into
account the optimal choices of risk and liquidity holding by banks. The probability
of no default from depositor’s perspective γd:
γd(l∗, p, R∗, z) =

Pr(y(l∗, 1, x, s; z) > 0) if z < z∗(l∗, p, R∗)
Pr(y(l∗, 0, x, s; z) > 0) if z ≥ z∗(l∗, p, R∗)
(1.30)
The equilibrium long term deposit rate R∗ the bank offers has to satisfy the
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depositors’ participation constraint:
R∗γd(l∗, p, R∗, z) = r¯. (1.31)
Given λ sufficiently small, l∗ = 0. The equilibrium R∗ is identical to the solution
in the basic model. Incorporating the equilibrium R∗ into z∗, we can rewrite z∗ as a
function of secondary market price p and aggregate mean return z.
Lemma 5 For λ sufficiently small, z∗ is decreasing in p.
The evolution of z∗ is the same as in the basic model. The lemma holds immedi-
ately by Lemma 3.33 Low price in the secondary market adversely affects the bank’s
payoffs and encourages risk-taking through a combination of direct and indirect ef-
fects.
1.4.3 The Aggregate Risk Taking of the Banking Sector
Due to the monotonicity of z∗ in p, similar to the analysis in the basic model, there
exists a threshold secondary market price pˆ(z) and it satisfies that
z = z∗(0, p, R∗(p, z)). (1.32)
The banking sector take high risk in long term investments when p is sufficiently low,
i.e., p < pˆ(z).
Given secondary market price p and the mean return z, the fraction of banks that
take risk in equilibrium is
33The result still holds when the bank has a mild incentive to hold liquid assets ex ante. When λ
is large and the incentive to hold liquid assets is strong, the negative indirect effect on z∗ through
the deposit rate may be partially offset by the liquid asset holding. The reason is that the high
deposit rate lowers the bank’s survival probability, leading to a decrease in the benefit of holding
cash ex ante. A low liquidity buffer ex ante lessens the risk shifting incentives by Lemma 4.
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n(p, z) =

1 if p < pˆ(z)
[0, 1] if p = pˆ(z)
0 if p > pˆ(z).
(1.33)
1.4.4 Characterization of the Equilibrium
The buyers’ valuation of the long term asset is in Equation 1.5.
Definition of the equilibrium: The rational expectation equilibrium is defined
by (l∗, θ∗, n∗, R∗, p∗) such that
a) l∗ and θ∗ are the optimal choices of liquidity and risk in asset returns chosen
by the banks given p∗ and R∗.
b) R∗ is the equilibrium long term deposit rate satisfying depositors participation
constraint given p∗ and optimal choices by the banks, l∗ and θ∗.
c) n∗ is the proportion of banks that take risk given p∗ .
d) p∗ is the valuation of long term asset by the buyers in the secondary market.
Similar to the basic model, the condition for the existence of multiple equilibria
is the following:
PROPOSITION 9 (Existence of Multiple Equilibria) Multiple equilibria
exist when pˆ(z) ∈ (p(1, z), p(0, z)) , where pˆ(z) is defined in Equation 1.32.
In the low volatility equilibrium, the secondary market is liquid with p > 1.
Expecting low volatility in asset returns, banks will not hoard liquid asset ex ante
because they expect that it will be easy to satisfy the liquidity need of its depositors.
The equilibrium behaves exactly the same as the one in the basic model. With all
its funds tying to the long term investments, the bank has less incentive to take risk
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because the cost of risk taking exceeds the benefit. So the volatility of asset returns
is low.
High volatility equilibrium exists when the buyers valuation for the risky assets is
low enough to induce the banking sector to take risk. Risky asset returns is associated
with lower price in the secondary market. With low λ, the likelihood of a positive
liquidity shock is low, and banks would not exploit the extra option of storing values.
In response to a low price, banks choose risky projects. As in the basic model, the
expectation of a low price in the secondary market can be self-fulfilling.
1.4.5 Liquidity Requirement
Because the equilibrium with the self-fulfilling crisis generates welfare loss, this section
analyzes how some standard macro-prudential policies affect the financial market
efficiency in the context of the model. Specifically, consider a liquidity requirement
imposed on the whole banking sector. Banks are required to hold at least κ units
of liquid assets for each unit of deposits. So there is an additional constraint in the
bank’s problem in Equation 1.25,
l ≥ κ.
For sufficiently low λ, banks have no incentives to hold liquid assets ex ante. The
liquidity requirement always has binding power.
Lemma 6 For κ small enough, the effect of liquidity regulation on risk-taking z∗:
(i) For p > 1,
∂z∗(κ, p,R∗)
∂κ
> 0. (1.34)
(ii) For p ≤ 1,
∂z∗(κ, p,R∗)
∂κ
< 0. (1.35)
As the liquidity regulation applies to all banks in the economy, a change in κ
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affects z∗ through two effects. First, it raises the liquidity holding of individual banks
given that the liquidity regulation has binding power. z∗ rises as banks are holding
more liquid assets according to Lemma 4. In addition to the impact on individual
banks, change in κ lowers the risk taking incentive through aggregate effects. As
the aggregate liquidity holding of banking sector rises, depositors expect a fall in the
credit risk as well as in the long term deposit rate. Combining the two effects, in the
presence of the liquidity requirement, the threshold in risk-taking behavior z∗ falls
for p ≤ 1 and rises for p > 1.
When p > 1, all banks have enough liquidity to cover the early withdrawals and
they can always survive date 1. Banks only default when they take risky investment
and experience the negative productivity shock at date 2, which takes place with
1/2 probability. Additional liquidity holding will affect neither the credit risk nor
the deposit rate. The effect of liquidity regulation on z∗ is identical to the effect
of individual liquidity holding as discussed in the previous section. When secondary
market price is expected to be high, a liquidity requirement will be counterproductive
by encouraging the banking sector to take more risk.
When p ≤ 1, the liquidity requirement κ > 0 can discourage risk taking by
banks. The intuition in the following. In addition to positive effect of liquidity
holding on risk-taking at individual levels as discussed previously, the increase in the
aggregate liquidity holding affects the equilibrium deposit rate R∗. With p < 1, early
withdrawals may potentially exceed the market value of bank asset (p(1− l) + l < 1),
in which case the bank will be forced to default at date 1 due to a liquidity shortage.
Holding more liquid assets strengthens bank’s ability to withstand liquidity shocks
and reduces the illiquidity risk and hence the credit risk of the bank. Therefore,
bank payoffs improve as depositors demand a lower deposit rate. In this case, with
improvement in bank payoffs, a liquidity requirement can rein in risk taking by banks.
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Effect of Liquidity Regulation on Multiple Equilibria
Given liquidity regulation κ, the aggregate choice of risk of the banking sector becomes
n(p, z) =

1 if p < pˆ(z;κ)
[0, 1] if p = pˆ(z;κ)
0 if p > pˆ(z;κ)
(1.36)
where the cutoff price pˆ(z;κ) is defined as
z = z∗(κ, p,R∗). (1.37)
PROPOSITION 10 (The Effect of κ on Aggregate Risk Taking) For κ
small enough, the effect of liquidity requirement κ on the aggregate risk taking:
(i) For p > 1,
∂pˆ(z;κ)
∂κ
> 0. (1.38)
(ii) For p ≤ 1,
∂pˆ(z;κ)
∂κ
< 0. (1.39)
The proposition can be shown immediately by Lemma 6. The model suggests that
the effect of a liquidity requirement is ambiguous in improving financial stability, as
shown in Figure 1·12.
When the secondary market price is low, banks are holding liquid assets at a
level which is lower than the social optimal level. The reason is that banks do not
internalize the effect of their liquidity holdings on the equilibrium credit risk and
deposit rate. Liquidity requirement reduces the risk-shifting incentives by reducing
the credit risk and hence the borrowing cost of banks and improving bank payoffs.
With less willingness to take risk, a lower secondary market price is required to
convince banks to take risk. The cutoff price shifts down for p ≤ 1, as shown in
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Figure 1·12: The Effect of κ on risk taking and on equilibrium
the left panel of Figure 1·12. The high volatility equilibrium becomes less likely to
exist. In another word, less z’s are admissible for the existence of the high volatility
equilibrium, as shown in the right panel of Figure 1·12. Liquidity requirement is
welfare-improving by enhancing financial stability for p ≤ 1.
However, when the secondary market price is expected to be high, the liquidity
requirement is potentially counterproductive in stabilizing the financial system. The
cost of forfeited long term returns outweighs the benefit from a stronger liquidity
buffer. Liquidity requirement restrains banks from making long term investments
and dampen their long term payoffs. As a result, banks are incentivized to rely on
risky returns to boost payoffs. The excessive risk taking reduces the occurrence of the
low volatility equilibrium. An increase in κ would intensify the risk-shifting incentives
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further and render the low volatility equilibrium less likely to exist. In Figure 1·12,
the cutoff price shifts up for p > 1 and less z’s are admissible for the existence of the
low volatility equilibrium.
In sum, the liquidity requirement reduces the occurrence of both the good and
bad equilibria. The model suggests that the liquidity requirement imposes a tradeoff
in the policy making process: improving financial stability in bad times (by reducing
the high volatility equilibrium) vs encouraging excess risk taking in good times (by
reducing the high volatility equilibrium).
Discussions on the Counter-cyclical Liquidity Requirement
The recent financial crisis sheds light on the pro-cyclicality of behaviors in the financial
market. There has been a growing consensus on the implementation of the counter-
cyclical regulations in promoting the resilience of the financial system.
The model provides theoretical arguments in favor of the implementation of counter-
cyclical liquidity requirement, in which the liquidity requirement is raised during
economic upturns and lowered during economic downturns. As discussed above, a
constant liquidity requirement imposes a tradeoff between improving financial stabil-
ity (by reducing the high volatility equilibrium) vs. encouraging excess risk taking
( by reducing the low volatility equilibrium). The counter-cyclical liquidity require-
ment is shown to promote financial stability by improving the tradeoff. The intuition
is the following.
The relative strength of the two sides of the tradeoff of a liquidity requirement
differs according to different levels of aggregate productivity. When the aggregate
productivity is high, a high liquidity requirement guarantees that banks hold enough
liquid assets as precautionary buffers for the upcoming liquidity shocks. The re-
quirement could effectively rein in excessive risk taking when fire sales are expected.
Meanwhile, it would not encourage risk taking significantly because during economic
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booms, long term projects generate high returns and the bank total payoffs are less
affected by holding more liquid assets.
On the contrary, when the aggregate productivity is low, a low liquidity require-
ment would reduce the incentive distortion and discouraging excessive risk taking
when the secondary market price is high. Meanwhile, the requirement may not fur-
ther intensify the risk taking incentives because during economic downturns, bank
payoffs are already low.
The model suggests that the liquidity requirement should be made counter-cyclical.
In this way, we can utilize the beneficial effect of a liquidity requirement while mini-
mize its counter-productive effect on the financial market in order to promote financial
stability.
In fact, the optimal liquidity requirement implied by the model is given by solving
the constrained first best problem that maximizes the aggregate expected payoff of
banks,
max
κ
U0(l, θ
∗; z). (1.40)
subject to the optimal risk taking of individual banks,
θ∗(κ, p,R∗, z) =

1 if z < z∗(κ, p,R∗)
0 if z ≥ z∗(κ, p,R∗),
(1.41)
and the equilibrium deposit rate is determined by the depositors participation con-
straint,
R∗γd(κ, p,R∗, z) = r¯. (1.42)
As illustrated in Figure 1·13, the resulting cutoff price for the aggregate risk taking
by banks, pˆ(z;κ∗(z)) is everywhere below the cutoff price with a constraint liquidity
requirement. The countercyclical liquidity requirement improves financial stability
by reducing risk taking incentives for all z.
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Figure 1·13: The Effect of Optimal Liquidity Requirement κ∗ on risk
taking
Discussions on the Interest Rate Policy
In recent years, negative interest rates have been widely discussed and deployed in
countries including the euro zone, Switzerland, and Japan. The implementation of a
negative interest rate means that the commercial banks are charged for holding excess
reserves with the central bank. Policy makers believe the negative rates can help boost
the economy in several ways. First, the sub-zero rate encourages commercial banks
to make more loans to avoid charges on cash hoarding. Second, it could help banks
raising fund by lowering the borrowing cost and increasing the relative appeal of
equities.
However, the model suggests that such policy potentially generates unintended
consequences. The bank may not be able to pass on the lower rate to its depositors
and other short term creditors, because their returns from outside options are limited
by the zero-interest cash. Due to the downward rigidity in the returns of creditors
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from outside options, the bank profits are squeezed. With lower profit margins, the
bank would prefer investing in riskier projects for the benefit of risk-shifting to boost
its payoff. As a result, the credit risk of banks rises. In stead of a lower borrowing
cost intended by the sub-zero rate policy, the banking sector could potentially face
a higher borrowing cost, leading to further disruptions in the banking sector. The
incentive to search for yield 34 imposes a challenge for the stability of the financial
system.
Empirical evidence confirms the existence of the search for yield effect. In periods
of low (but positive) interest rates, banks indeed lowered their lending standard and
shifted their credit to less qualified creditors.35 Recently, the latest ECB Survey on
the Access to Finance of Enterprises in the Euro Area (SAFE) shows that bank loans
for SMEs become more available after the introduction of the negative interest rate.36
The paper suggests that the negative interest rate policy can generate some un-
intended consequences that the policy makers need to pay attention to. Whether or
not the negative rate is effective in boosting the real economy needs a more compre-
hensive examine and it is beyond the scope of this paper. The paper wants to bring
attention the potential that incentives of the financial sector play a role in affecting
the effectiveness of the interest rate policy.
Moreover, the negative rate may not be enough to cure economic recessions. Nei-
ther is it the only policy tool on the menu for central banks. To mitigate the adverse
effects of the negative rate policy, other unconventional monetary policy tools such
as quantitative easing and forward guidance should be considered.
34See [78]Rajan (2006)
35See, for example, [56]Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydro (2009), [68]Maddaloni and Peydro(2011),
[58]Jimenez et al (2014) and [33]Dell’Ariccia, Laeven and G. Suarez(forthcoming).
36See [40]March 2016 SAFE surveys
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1.5 Conclusion
The paper points out a novel mechanism through which a deterioration of finan-
cial health in the banking sector would affect the financial stability. The channel is
through risk taking of banks. In the model, the risk taking behavior of banks gives
rise to strategic complementarity. When in need of liquid assets to pay for the early
withdrawals, banks may have to liquidate their long term assets in the secondary mar-
ket. When some banks take risky investment, they adversely affect the asset price
in the secondary market and hence reduce the capability of banks to withstand the
liquidity shocks, leading to stronger risk shifting incentives of other banks. There-
fore, the risk taking of banks endangers financial stability by rendering the financial
system more vulnerable to panics on asset market liquidity. In the model setting,
a liquidity requirement imposes a tradeoff between improving financial stability in
economic downturns and encouraging risk taking in economic booms. Therefore, a
counter-cyclical liquidity requirement would be more effective in promoting financial
stability.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks on the
Firm’s Customer Base
2.1 Introduction
A large body of work in macroeconomics have devoted in studying the impact of
fluctuations in economic uncertainty on business cycle dynamics. This line of research
focuses on firm investment in physical capital1. Treating future investment of firms
as a “real option”, the literature emphasizes the “wait and see” effect, in which
uncertainty raises the value of delaying investment and makes investment today less
desirable. The empirical evidence in general supports a negative relation between
investment and uncertainty fluctuations2.
The study of uncertainty fluctuations within the framework of firm investment in
physical capital is abundant. However, in addition to building physical capital stock,
firms also need to spend substantial resources on marketing and selling. In fact, firms’
expenditure on marketing has been estimated to make up up to five percent of GDP3.
Such expenditure can be interpreted as firm’s effort in acquiring new customers and
building up its customer base. Firm’s existing customer base, which measures the
amount of customers the firm can reach, determines how much the firm is able to sell.
Therefore, firm’s customer base can be seen as a form of intangible capital needed to
1Details in [77]Pindyck(1990), [37]Dixit and Pindyck(1994), [1]Abel and Eberly(1996), [22]Bloom
et al.(2012).
2See [21]Bloom(2009).
3As mentioned in [9]Arkolakis(2010).
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generate revenue. The paper studies firm investment on customer base and how it
can be affected by fluctuations of economic uncertainty . Because of the considerable
size of marketing expenditure, taking into account the investment in customer base
is one important step further towards understanding how fluctuations in economic
uncertainty influence real business cycles.
This chapter conducts an empirical analysis on the impact of time-varying id-
iosyncratic uncertainty on customer capital investment by looking at the investment
activities of U.S non-financial firms. Similar to the case of physical capital invest-
ment, the result suggests a negative relation between customer capital investment and
idiosyncratic uncertainty: firms respond to an increase in idiosyncratic uncertainty
by scaling down their customer base investment.
The fact that firms need to spend resources on attracting new customers suggests
that a firm’s total sales can be constrained by the amount of customers it can reach,
indicating the presence of frictions in the product market. Therefore, the transmission
mechanism of uncertainty shock to customer base investment can be different from the
traditional “wait and see” effect. One alternative explanation for the transmission of
uncertainty shock rely on its interaction with product market frictions. The intuition
is the following. The need for customer base investment implies that firm’s revenue is
now jointly determined by both its production capacity and its sales capacity. Firms
with small customer base are less capable in reaching customers and thus the revenue
is limited by the size of their customer base. As economic uncertainty widens, these
firms suffer profitability loss as they cannot reap the benefit of an upside productivity
shock while they have to bear the full-sized cost of a downside productivity shock.
Consequently, they are discouraged to make high investments.
This hypothetical explanation indicates a heterogeneity in firms’ responses to id-
iosyncratic uncertainty shocks: firms with low customer base would be more averse to
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uncertainty. To test this hypothesis, I consider incorporating an interaction term of
uncertainty and the size of the firm’s customer base in the dynamic panel regression.
The new regression yields a significant and robust positive coefficient for the interac-
tion term, confirming the hypothesis on heterogeneous uncertainty aversion. Firms
with low customer base contract investment by more in presence of an uncertainty
shock.
Spending resources on marketing and selling activities indicates that in reality
it is costly for sellers and buyers to meet in the market. Treating this as evidence
of frictions in the product market4, the paper then develops a stylized model where
firm’s revenue is constrained by both its production capacity and its sales capacity,
which is positively related to its customer base. With the presence of product market
frictions, I propose a novel mechanism through which uncertainty shocks negatively
affect firm activities that is consistent with the empirical findings.
To sum up, this chapter investigates the impact of fluctuations in uncertainty on
firm’s investment in customer capital. The empirical study finds that similar to the
case of physical capital investment, idiosyncratic uncertainty has a robust and neg-
ative impact on customer capital investment. However, different from the case for
physical capital investment, firms with lower customer base tend to be more sensitive
to uncertainty. The empirical analysis suggests an alternative transmission mecha-
nism for uncertainty shocks to the real economy that relies on the interaction between
idiosyncratic uncertainty and product market frictions. Based on these observations,
I build a model to study a novel pass-through of uncertainty shocks to real economic
activities. The model complements the existing framework in assessing the impact of
time-varying uncertainty on business cycle dynamics.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related research. Section
3 presents the empirical study, which focuses on the investment in customer base.
4See [51]Gourio and Rudanko(2011)
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Section 4 develops a model to study the negative impact of uncertainty shocks on firm
activities, followed by a calibration of the model in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This chapter is related to a large body of work on uncertainty shocks. In this liter-
ature, there are mainly two transmission mechanisms for uncertainty shock. One is
through the irreversibility in factors of production. With adjustment cost, firms have
the incentive to delay investment and to wait for uncertainty to resolve. Uncertainty
discourages investment by raising the option value of waiting. Papers exploring this
channel include the seminal paper by [21]Bloom(2009). He considers non-convex ad-
justment cost for both capital and labor. [67]Leduc and Liu(2016) considers search
frictions in labor market as the transmission mechanism of uncertainty shock. The
irreversibility arises in the DMP labor market, since the hiring of labor is forming a
long term relationship with the firm. Firm becomes more cautious when uncertainty
arises.
The other mechanism through which uncertainties have real impacts is to incorpo-
rate financial frictions in firm’s problem. Papers discussing this include [50]Gilchrist,
Sim and Zakrajsek(2014). They incorporate uninsurable default in firm’s problem.
Uncertainty shock raises the probability of low productivity realizations and hence the
probability of default. Firm’s borrowing cost rises with uncertainty. [7]Arellano, Bai
and Kehoe(2014) considers uninsurable default and its interaction with labor mar-
ket. With financial frictions limiting firms’ ability to insure against shocks, widening
productivity shocks leads to high cost of increasing labor. Both of the papers imply
rising credit spreads and falling aggregate output with uncertainty shocks.
This chapter is related to both channels. The long term nature of the customer
relationship in the study naturally implies irreversibility of customer base given that
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firms cannot freely adjust its customer base. However, the main mechanism here does
not rely on the traditional “wait-and-see” effect: the stylized model does not need to
assume non-convex adjustment costs for physical capital or customer base. In this
sense, the study is more related to the second mechanism where uncertainty exerts
additional loss to firms. In stead of borrowing cost, widening uncertainty raises the
cost of customer base maintenance. Firms are discouraged to engage in investment
activity in response to an increase in uncertainty.
This chapter is also related to the literature on customer capital. Gourio and
Rudanko (2012) develop a search-based model of firm’s problem with frictional prod-
uct market and study firm dynamics. Similar to their paper, I consider customer
capital as a state variable and subject to costly adjustment. They focus on the mo-
ment when firms and customers form the long term relationship and firms are offering
discounts to attract new customers. Different from their paper, I focus on the prospect
that when firm productivity is low, it faces the danger of losing customers. Under
this scenario, firm has to lower its price to obtain customer loyalty. The presence
of time varying volatility tends to make firms more cautious about customer base
building due to the additional cost associated with maintaining the existing customer
relationships.
2.3 Empirical Evidence
2.3.1 Data
This chapter uses micro-level dataset to analyze firm’s response to fluctuations in
economic uncertainty. The empirical evidence indicates a significant and negative
impact of uncertainty on customer capital investment and the impact occurs through
the presence of product market frictions.
The information on investment activities of firms are extracted from COMPUS-
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TAT data base by looking into annual financial reports of U.S public non-financial
firms from 1985 to 2015. Besides financial firms, I also exclude firms in public utilities
sector, since both industries are highly regulated by the government and thus they
could respond differently to real economic shocks comparing with other industries.
The most common approach for firms to attract new customers is through ad-
vertisement campaign. Therefore advertisement expenditure could potentially reflect
the firm’s effort on customer base investment.5 In the empirical analysis, the key
dependent variable of interest is firm’s advertisement expenditure.
In the literature, there are multiple approaches to measure uncertainty. I use
information from financial markets to estimate the firm-level uncertainty. Specifically,
I collect monthly stock prices for all U.S. non-financial firms from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data base and use the variation of forecast errors
of firm stock return as a proxy for the time-varying idiosyncratic uncertainty.6
2.3.2 Measure of Uncertainty
The estimate of time-varying idiosyncratic uncertainty is computed in two steps.
First, I fit the firm stock return in a Fama-French 3 Factor model.7:
Ritm − rftm = αi + βi(KMtm − rftm) + βsSMBtm + βvHMLtm + uitm , (2.1)
where i indexes firms and tm indexes month m in year t. Ritm denotes the firm
i stock return at mth month in year t. rftm denotes the risk-free rate in the same
5Ideally, total marketing expense should be considered as customer base investment. But the line
item is not always available in firm’s financial statement. So I use advertisement expenditure as a
proxy for it.
6Similar measure has been adopted by Gilchrist et al(2014). Other ways to measure uncertainty
includes cross-sectional dispersion of TFP shock, the cross-sectional dispersion of sales growth (as
in Bloom et al(2011)), and time varying standard deviation of firm’s stock return. The results are
not sensitive to different measures of uncertainty.
7The result is robust to different versions of factor model, including a 4-factor model proposed
by Carhart(1997) and 5-factor model by Fama-French 5 factor model.
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period. KMtm − rftm , SMBtm and HMLtm denote the three factors in [43]Fama and
French(1992), which are the excess returns of market portfolio, small capitalized firms
and value stocks respectively.
Second, I compute the measure of annual firm-level idiosyncratic uncertainty as
the standard deviation of monthly idiosyncratic returns,
σit =
√
1
M
Σm=Mm=1 (uˆitm − ¯ˆuit)2, (2.2)
where uˆitm is the OLS residual from Equation 2.1, reflecting the unforecastable return
for firm i. ¯ˆuit =
1
M
Σm=Mm=1 uˆitm is the mean of the OLS residuals at year t. σit measures
the time-varying variation of idiosyncratic return for firm i, and thus can be seen as
a measure for firm-level uncertainty.
Figure 2·1 plots the evolution of idiosyncratic uncertainty, averaging across firms.
The periods of heightened uncertainty coincide with the times of economic recession.
2.3.3 Measure of Customer Capital Investment
As mentioned before, the paper uses firm’s advertisement expenditure as a proxy
for firm’s customer capital investment. Figure 2·2 plots the fraction of firms with
recorded advertisement expenditure on their financial statements. The data coverage
is around 20 to 40 percent of all U.S. non-financial public firms across years.8
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for advertisement and capital expendi-
ture, scaled by total sales. The result suggests that firms across industries tend to
spend more on physical capital than advertisement on average, with the expenditure
gap differing across industries. In addition, capital expenditure tends to be more
volatile than advertisement expenditure.
Dynamically, Figure 2·3 plots the evolution of firm investment in physical and
8Firms are persistent in their financial reporting: firms with recorded advertisement expenditure
keep their practices across years.
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Note: Shaded areas represent economic recessions in the U.S. defined by NBER.
Figure 2·1: Time-Varying Idiosyncratic Uncertainty
customer capital in retail and services industries respectively. Investments in the two
types of capital tend to move together and contract in recessions, suggesting that
physical and customer base investments are correlated.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Firm Expenditures on Advertise-
ment and Capital
Advertisement Capital
Mean S.D Mean S.D
Manufacturing .0642513 1.305205 .4611961 28.22998
Transportation .0811001 1.066958 1.659795 71.21343
Retail Trade .0419027 .2229605 .0954607 1.895964
Services .2208721 6.381372 .595567 29.3813
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Figure 2·2: Fraction of Firms with Recorded Advertisement Expen-
diture
2.3.4 Measure of Customer Base
Note that the notion of customer base (or customer capital) cannot be seen directly
from firm financial reports and thus worths some additional thoughts. This subsection
discusses the measure of customer capital the empirical study adopts.
Parallel to physical capital stock, firm’s customer base can be approximated by the
accumulation of advertisement expenditure with some fixed attrition rate. Assuming
one unit of resource spent on advertisement will lead to one unit increase in customer
base. Following [15]Belo et al.(2014) and [86]Vitorino(2014), the paper constructs an
estimate of customer capital using the perpetual inventory method. That is,
Bit+1 = (1− δn)Bit + eit, (2.3)
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Note: physical capital investment in green and customer capital investment in red.
Figure 2·3: Dynamics of Firm Investment in Physical and Customer
Capital
where Bit denotes the size of firm i’s customer base in year t. δn denotes the attrition
rate for customer capital.9 eit represents the amount of new customers the firm
attracts. As mentioned above, the chapter assumes a one-to-one relation between
the advertisement expenditure and new customer base formed.10 Additionally, the
perpetual inventory method requires a customer base endowment for each firm to
begin with. Following the common practice in marketing literature, the paper sets
the initial customer base Bi0 as
Bi0 =
ei0
δn + gi
, (2.4)
9The chapter uses δn = .2, which is commonly used in the marketing literature. For simplicity,
also assume the attrition rate is constant across industries.
10The empirical finding in this chapter is robust to other functional forms that convert advertise-
ment expenditure into customer base.
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where gi is the average growth rate of total sales for the firm i.
2.3.5 Effect of Uncertainty on Investments
The main question this chapter wants to address is how economic uncertainty affects
firm’s investment in customer base. Following [23]Bloom et al(2007) and [50]Gilchrist
et at (2014), to answer this question, the chapter regresses customer capital invest-
ment on a firm-specific measure of idiosyncratic volatility, while controlling factors
determining firm’s investment expenditure. The key dynamic panel regression I con-
sider is the following,
log xit = b0 + b1 log xit−1 + b2 log σit + θ′ logZit + ηi + λt + it, (2.5)
where xit denotes the investment rate (in either physical capital or customer base)
of firm i at time t, σit is a measure of firm-level uncertainty, Zit includes firm-level
fundamentals that influence firm’s investment decision. Following the literature on
uncertainty, three fundamental variables that affect firm’s investment are considered
here. They are sales-to-capital ratio ([Y/K]it), profit-to-capital ratio ([Π/K]it) and
Tobin’s Q (Qit) which represents firm’s expectation of future growth. In addition,
the regression includes firm-level fixed effect ηi in order to take into account the
systematic differences in investment rates across firms. The time fixed effects controls
for macroeconomic factors such as output and interest rate that affect all firms in the
sample.
The physical capital investment rate ([I/K]it) measures physical capital invest-
ment intensity. As is done by most studies in the literature11, the investment rate
is indicated by fixed capital expenditure (an income statement item) scaled by total
asset (an balance sheet item).12 Firm’s customer capital investment rate ([e/B]it)
11See [60]Kaplan and Zingales(1997), [71]Mayers(1998), and [62]Korkeamaki and Moore(2004).
12The measure can also be scaled by property, plant, and equipment (PPE). The results are robust
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considered in the regression is its advertisement expenditure scaled by its customer
base.13
Because the dynamic nature of the regression, the error term is time-serially cor-
related. The specification is estimated by GMM using a one-step weighting matrix14.
Table 2.2 summarizes the result of the impact of uncertainty on customer capital in-
vestment. That is, consider regression in Equation 2.5 with xit = log[e/B]it. With dif-
ferent fundamental factors considered, the regression yields a statistically significant
and negative coefficient for idiosyncratic uncertainty, indicating that time-varying
uncertainty has negative impact on firm’s customer base investment.
Table 2.2: Effect of Idiosyncratic Uncertainty on Customer Base In-
vestment
(1) (2) (3)
log σit -0.363*** -0.335*** -0.303***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
log[e/B]i,t−1 0.687*** 0.641*** 0.678***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
log[Y/K]it 0.149***
(0.01)
logQi,t−1 0.091***
(0.01)
log[Π/K]it 0.197***
(0.03)
Observations 29284 28415 28729
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm level
Table 2.3 summarizes the regression result for physical capital investment, i.e.,
xit = [I/K]it. The result shows a significant and robust negative effect of uncertainty,
which is consistent with the findings in the existing literature on uncertainty shocks.
to alternative measures of investment rate.
13Alternatively, the investment rate scaled by its total assets, [e/K]it, is also considered. The
result does not change qualitatively.
14Details are in [8]Arellano and Bover(1995).
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It is worth noting that the sizes of the impact of uncertainty on firm investments
are of similar magnitudes, suggesting that the fall in customer capital investment is
an equally important channel through which the uncertainty negatively affects firm
dynamics..
Table 2.3: Effect of Idiosyncratic Uncertainty on Physical Capital
Investment
(1) (2) (3)
log σit -0.301*** -0.403*** -0.281***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
log[I/K]i,t−1 0.574*** 0.573*** 0.679***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
log[Y/K]it 0.197***
(0.01)
logQi,t−1 0.153***
(0.01)
log[Π/K]it 0.295***
(0.02)
Observations 95878 93923 92997
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm level
2.3.6 Heterogeneous Effects of Uncertainty Shocks on Investments
The fact that firms need to spend resources on attracting new customers indicates
frictions in product market: sales would be dependent on the amount of customers
the firm can reach, in addition to its production capacity. Therefore, the transmis-
sion mechanism of uncertainty shock can be different from the traditional “wait and
see” effect. One potential explanation for the transmission of uncertainty shocks
is through the interaction between uncertainty shocks and product market frictions.
With product market frictions, firm with small customer base is less capable of reach-
ing customers to make a sale, and thus its revenue would be limited by the size of its
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customer base. As economic uncertainty widens, these firms suffer profitability loss
as they cannot reap the benefit of an upside productivity shock while they bear the
full-sized cost of a downside productivity shock. Consequently they are discouraged
to make customer base investment. This explanation indicates heterogeneity in firms’
responses to idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks: firms with low customer base would be
more averse to uncertainty by investing less in building its customer base.
To test if there exists heterogeneity in firm’s investment in response to uncertainty,
I divide the date set into two groups of observations according to the size of customer
base (i.e., Low Base and High Base) and I empirically test if the responses of customer
base investment are different. Table 2.4 summarizes the results of the same regression
as in Equation 2.5. Columns (1) - (3) are results with low customer base and (4) -
(6) are results with high customer base.15 The result suggests that the effect of
uncertainty on customer capital investment is larger (more negative) for firms with
small customer base.
Alternatively, to test this hypothesis regarding the transmission mechanism of
uncertainty shock more rigorously, I consider incorporating an interaction term of
uncertainty and firm customer base in the dynamic panel regression in Equation 2.5.
The dynamic specification of the new regression becomes:
log[e/B]it = β0+β1 log[e/B]i,t−1+β2 log σit+β3 log σit×log[B/Y ]it+θ′ logZit+ηi+λt+it.
(2.6)
The marginal effect of uncertainty on firm customer base investment becomes
2 + β3 log[B/Y ]it. A positive b3 would imply that the marginal effect is larger (more
negative) for firms with low customer base. This in turn, would confirm the hypoth-
esis that firms with low customer base are more averse to uncertainty. Otherwise, a
15In the empirical analysis, I set log[e/B] = 1.5 as the threshold separating the two subsets of
data. The cutoff point is arbitrarily set and can be changed without yielding qualitatively different
results.
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Table 2.4: Effects of Idiosyncratic Uncertainty on Customer Capital
Investments with Different Customer Base
Low Base High Base
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log σit -0.424*** -0.396*** -0.360*** -0.315*** -0.333*** -0.251***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
log[e/B]i,t−1 0.538*** 0.546*** 0.560*** 0.758*** 0.716*** 0.741***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
log[Y/K]it 0.107*** 0.179***
(0.02) (0.01)
logQi,t−1 0.057* 0.066***
(0.02) (0.01)
log[Π/K]it 0.114** 0.260***
(0.04) (0.03)
Observations 8266 8155 8154 21018 20260 20575
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm level
negative β3 would prove the inconsistency between the proposed transmission mech-
anism of uncertainty shock and the empirical evidence.
The estimation result is summarized in the Table 2.5. The new regression yields
a significant and robust positive coefficient for the interaction term, confirming my
hypothesis on heterogenous uncertainty aversion. Firms with low customer base con-
tract their investment by more in presence of an uncertainty shock.
The empirical finding suggests heterogenous responses of firm investments to id-
iosyncratic uncertainty. The intuition is the following. When firm has a small cus-
tomer base, it suffers profitability loss because with limited sale capacity, the firm ’s
payoff is constrained by the amount of customers it can reach, rendering its payoff
structure concave in productivity. A widening uncertainty in productivity results in
a decline in the firm’s expected revenue and thus discourages firm investment. As the
firm’s customer base becomes larger, the firm’s payoff is less constrained and thus is
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Table 2.5: Heterogenous Effects of Idiosyncratic Uncertainty on Cus-
tomer Capital Investments
(1) (2) (3)
log σit -0.174*** -0.205*** -0.183***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
log σit × log[B/K]it 0.036*** 0.024*** 0.019***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
log[e/B]i,t−1 0.648*** 0.602*** 0.653***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
log[Y/K]it 0.191***
(0.01)
logQi,t−1 0.119***
(0.01)
log[Π/K]it 0.220***
(0.03)
Observations 29282 28413 28727
Note: Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the firm level
less affected by uncertainty. Consequently, the firm’s investment is less sensitive to
fluctuations in uncertainty.
To account for the empirical findings, the next section presents a stylized model
that formalizes the proposed transmission mechanism of uncertainty as discussed
above, in order to illustrate theoretically the negative and heterogenous effects of
firm-level uncertainty on the customer base investments and on firm dynamics.
2.4 Model
Based on these empirical findings, this section of the paper builds a dynamic model
to illustrate the negative impact of uncertainty on firm investment and on the real
economy by focusing on the interaction between uncertainty shocks with product
market frictions.
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2.4.1 Customer Base
I adopt the concept of customer capital used in [51]Gourio and Rudanko(2014) in
the neoclassical investment model as customer base, and develop a new mechanism
for the transmission of uncertainty shock by considering firm’s investment in the new
type of capital.
Firms form long-term relationships with customers. The customer base can be
seen as a form of intangible asset to the firm. Let Bt denote the firm’s current
customer base. Each period, the firm is only able to sell its products to its existing
customer base. Assume new customers are unreachable for the sales of the current
period. At the end of each period, δa fraction of customers may decide to terminate
the relationship with the seller due to some exogenous reasons. Moreover, the firm
can choose to acquire new customers et by spending resources f(et, Bt). Intuitively,
f(et, Bt) represents selling and marketing cost.
The evolution of customer capital can be written as
Bt+1 = (1− δa)Bt + et. (2.7)
2.4.2 Technology
Firm has a production function
yt = ztK
α
t , (2.8)
where Kt is physical capital and zt is idiosyncratic technology shock. For simplicity,
assume there is no labor in this economy.
The evolution of idiosyncratic TFP shock is an AR(1) process,
log zt+1 = ρ log zt + (1− ρ)(µz − 1
2
σ2t ) + σtt+1, (2.9)
where µz is a fixed parameter, and the innovations t+1 ∼ N(0, 1) are independent
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across firms. Therefore µ is the unconditional mean of productivity shock zt+1.
The volatility of TFP shock, σt approximates the following process,
log σt+1 = ρσ log σt + (1− ρσ)µσ + ψvt+1, (2.10)
where innovation vt+1 ∼ N(0, 1).
The model features friction in the product market. The total sales of a firm is
limited by both its production capacity and its selling capacity, which is indicated by
the size of the firm’s current customer base. Therefore,
Πt = min{ztKαt , Bt}. (2.11)
Let zˆt satisfy that
zˆKαt = Bt.
zˆt is the minimum productivity required such that total production could satisfy every
existing customer in the customer base. Denote zˆ the threshold productivity. Below
the threshold, customers could only get the products until the supply runs out.
2.4.3 Customer’s Problem
There is a continuum of customers. A part of the customers are attracted by firm’s
advertisement campaign and become members of the firm’s customer base. Denote
this group of customers the inside customers. They would be willing to purchase the
firm’s product. The rest of the customers have not yet been reached by the firm and
so they are not aware of the product, or have terminated their relationship with the
firm. This part of the customers forms the firm’s potential customer base that firm
would use resources to attract. Denote them as potential customers.
For simplicity, assume that each customer would demand only one unit of the
product. In another word, individual demand is inelastic. The product generates
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constant value u. Given the price of the product p, the net value the customer can
get is u− p. If choosing to keep the relationship with the firm, each inside customer
would be able to get the product with a probability, which depends on the firm’s
productivity. The higher the productivity, the more likely that the firm is able to
satisfy all customers in its customer base. Each customer also has an outside option
v0. The intuitive interpretation of v0 is that it represents the value generated from
household’s home production. At the beginning of each period, each inside customer
compares the expected value he could get if he remains a loyal customer to the firm
and his outside option.16
2.4.4 Pricing decision
At the beginning of each period, firm has to list the price of its products before the
realization of TFP. Given the price, inside customers will decide whether to leave the
firm. After TFP is realized, firm earns revenue pΠ(K,B, z) and use resources f(e, B)
to attract new customers e.
When firm chooses the optimal price level, it is contemplating the trade-off be-
tween unit price and sales volume since high prices discourage customers. 17 Taking
into account the incentives of inside customers, the firm set its prices to satisfy the
following equation:
Emin
{ztKαt
Bt
, 1
}
(u− pt) = v0. (2.12)
That is equivalent to
{ zˆt∫
0
zt
zˆt
dF (zt) +
∞∫
zˆt
1dF (zt)
}
(u− pt) = v0, (2.13)
16For simplicity, assume the customers are myopic.
17Assume that the marginal cost of attracting a new customer is large enough, such that it is
never optimal to slash the existing customer base by setting a higher price.The assumption is not
too strict since the firm does not receive new information from investment decision last period to
pricing decision this period.
71
where the threshold productivity zˆ = B
Kα
. Therefore firm’s pricing decision can be
expressed as
p(zˆt) = u− v0
D(zˆt)
(2.14)
with
D(zˆT ) =
zˆt∫
0
zt
zˆt
dF (zt) + 1− F (zˆt). (2.15)
The price is set to make sure customers will not leave. Giving the firm’s price
setting behavior, the following propositions hold naturally.
Proposition 1 Price is decreasing in the dispersion of TFP distribution, i.e.,
∂p/∂σ < 0. (2.16)
Proof Take derivative of Equation 2.14 with respect to uncertainty σ,
∂p
∂σ
=
v0
D(zˆ)2
∂D(zˆ)
∂σ
< 0. (2.17)
Q.E.D
As the TFP distribution F (z) becomes more dispersed, firm tends to price at a
lower level. The intuition is that a widened TFP distribution implies an increas-
ing probability that the firm would not be able to satisfy its entire customer base.
Consequently, the firm has to lower its price to convince its customers to stay.
Proposition 2 Price is decreasing in the threshold productivity zˆ. i.e.,
∂p/∂zˆ < 0. (2.18)
Proof Take derivative of Equation 2.14 with respect to the threshold productivity
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zˆ,
∂p
∂zˆ
=
v0
D(zˆ)2
(
−1
zˆ
) zˆ∫
0
z
zˆ
dF (z) < 0. (2.19)
Q.E.D
Firm tends to set a lower price when the threshold TFP zˆ is elevated. Similar to
the reasoning above, the intuition is the following. The threshold productivity zˆ is the
minimum productivity required in order to guarantee all customers can be satisfied.
A low physical capital or a large customer base both require high productivity not to
lose any customers. A high threshold means that the firm is less capable of satisfying
its inside customers and the firm has to cut prices to maintain its customer base.
2.4.5 Firm’s Problem
The firm is solving the following maximization problem:
V (Kt, Bt, zt) = max
e,I
{dt + βEtV (Kt+1, Bt+1, zt+1)}, (2.20)
subject to
dt = p(zˆt)Πt − f(et, Bt)− It − φ(It, Kt), (2.21)
Πt = min{ztKαt , Bt}, (2.22)
Bt+1 = (1− δa)Bt + et, (2.23)
Kt+1 = (1− δk)Kt + It, (2.24)
et, It ≥ 0. (2.25)
f(e, B) and φ(I,K) are adjustment cost for investment in customer and physical
capital respectively. 18
18Assume both adjustment costs are convex.
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2.4.6 Solution to the Firm’s Problem
The first order condition w.r.t e yields,
fe(et, Bt) = βEt
(
∂p(zˆt+1)Πt+1
∂Bt+1
− fB(et+1, Bt+1)
)
(2.26)
where
∂p(zˆt)Πt
∂Bt
=

p′(zˆt)zˆt + p(zˆt) if zt > zˆt
p′(zˆt)zt if zt ≤ zˆt.
(2.27)
Customer base affects firm income through two channels, quantity impact and
price impact. According to the firm’s TFP, different channels can dominate the total
impact. When firm TFP is low, i.e., zt ≤ zˆt, an additional customer raises the
possibility that the firm is not able to satisfy all its customers. Therefore the firm
needs to lower its unit price by p′(zˆ) ∂zˆ
∂B
. The price impact on total sales is
p′(zˆ)
∂zˆ
∂B
Π(K,B, z).
The marginal benefit of attracting new customers is negative. That means, the firms
revenue will be reduced by p′(zˆ)z unless z reaches zˆ.
When firm TFP is large, i.e., z > zˆ, the loss from additional customer base
investment, i.e., the price impact, is limited at p′(zˆ) ∂zˆ
∂B
B. In addition, one new
customer raises revenue by p(zˆ), which is the quantity impact on total sale. It can
be shown that the quantity impact dominates the negative price impact.
Take expectations of the marginal benefit of customer base,
Et
(
∂p(zˆt+1)Π(Kt+1, Bt+1, zt+1)
∂Bt+1
)
= u(1− F (zˆt+1|zt))− v0
= u
(
1− Φ(log zˆt+1 − Etlogzt+1
σt
)
)− v0, (2.28)
where Φ is the cdf function of the standard normal distribution.
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The key feature of the new transmission mechanism of uncertainty shock lies in
how firm productivity determines marginal benefit of customer base.
2.4.7 the Effect of Uncertainty Shocks
As mentioned above, the novel feature of the model lies in how customer base affects
total sales according to different TFP realizations. Different distributions of TFP
shock alters the expected marginal value of customer base in some non-trivial way.
Therefore, shocks on productivity volatility affects firm’s investment on customer base
through changes in future expected marginal benefits of investment.
Proposition 3 Uncertainties in productivity shock discourage customer base in-
vestment when (i) the threshold productivity zˆt+1 is sufficiently low, i.e.,
log zˆt+1 ≤ ρ log zt + (1− ρ)µz; (2.29)
(ii) the threshold productivity zˆt+1 is large, while the volatility of productivity shock is
sufficiently large,
σt ≥
√
log zˆt − ρ log zt − (1− ρ)µz
(1− ρ)µz . (2.30)
Following Equation 2.28, the model implies that the time varying volatility affects
expected marginal benefit of customer base investment. When threshold TFP log zˆt+1
is sufficiently low, such that
log zˆt+1 ≤ ρ log zt + (1− ρ)µz,
an uncertainty shock raises the probability of the TFP shock below the threshold zˆt+1
through expanding the lower tail of the distribution. With an elevated F (zˆt+1|zt),
firms are less able to satisfy its existing customer base. As a result, firms expects
low returns of customer base investment in the future, which dis-incentivizes firms to
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engage in investment activities. The similar reasoning can be applied to the second
scenario with a high productivity threshold zˆt combined with a high volatility shock
σt. In both cases, uncertainty shock discourages customer base investment.
Note that firms with different sizes of customer base react differently to uncertainty
shocks:
Proposition 4 Under the condition (i) in Proposition 3, firms with low customer
base respond to uncertainty shocks by cutting more investment.
The results follows from the fact that
∂2F (zˆt+1|zt)
∂Bt∂σt
< 0. (2.31)
For firms with low customer base Bt, a widening uncertainty exerts a larger impact on
the marginal return of customer, i.e., ∂F (zˆt+1|zt)
∂σt
is decreasing in Bt. That means, firms
with low customer base, have marginal returns of customer (i.e., u(1− F (zˆt+1|zt))−
v0) more sensitive to uncertainty shocks. Expecting larger decline in returns, they
respond to uncertainty shocks by reducing more investment.
2.5 Discussion
The model provides a micro-founded explanation for the empirical finding on the
firm’s response to economic fluctuations. The intuition relies on the role of customer
capital in generating sales. With the firm’s sales capacity limited by its customer
base, the firm cannot fully utilize the benefit from a widening fluctuations in TFP.
The firm cut back on customer base investment, as a result of a deterioration of
expected profits. To quantify the interaction between production market frictions
and uncertainty shocks in a general equilibrium model is beyond the scope of this
chapter and could be an interesting research topic to pursue in the future.
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2.6 Conclusion
The paper investigates the impact of fluctuations in uncertainty on firm’s investment
in customer capital. The empirical study finds that similar to the case of physical
capital investment, idiosyncratic uncertainty has a robust and negative impact on
customer capital investment. However, different from the case for physical capital
investment, firms with lower customer base tend to be more sensitive to uncertainty.
The empirical analysis suggests an alternative transmission mechanism for uncer-
tainty shocks to the real economy that relies on the interaction between idiosyncratic
uncertainty and product market frictions. Based on these observations, I build a
model to study a novel pass-through of uncertainty shocks to real activities. In the
presence of product market fractions, firm’s revenue is now jointly determined by
its production capacity and its customer base. The model complements the existing
firm investment framework for the study of the impact of time varying uncertainty
on business cycle dynamics.
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Chapter 3
Imperfect Credibility of Central Banks
Credibility is pivotal for the conduct of optimal monetary policy design. When cen-
tral banks confront the trade-off between inflation and unemployment, they need to
consider private sectors expectation. A credible policy announcement can influence
private sectors expectation on future inflation and ease the pain of a tightening pol-
icy today. However, central bank has an ex post incentive to renege on outstanding
promises. Once the economy delivers the promised recession, the tightening policy
will not be desirable anymore. Due to the time inconsistent nature of such policy,
central bank credibility is vulnerable to public skepticism. So we need a model to
incorporate such public skepticism and central bank’s limited ability to commit in
optimal policy design.
Following [64]Kydland and Prescott (1977) and [14]Barro and Gordon(1983), mon-
etary policy literature focused on one of the two extreme scenarios: full commitment
and discretion. When central bank is not able to commit to its outstanding promises,
it makes monetary policy period by period, in which case a cost-push shock will
lead to a full-size recession. To obtain a favorable trade-off between output and in-
flation, central bank has to be able to commit. Then central bank can reap the
benefit from the policy announcement by effective forward guidance. However, both
cases are unrealistic in some sense. In reality, central bank does commit to its policy
announcements but only to a certain degree. This paper is built on this empirical
fact.
78
To model the central bank with a partial ability to commit, the notion of credibility
need to be properly introduced. Credibility here is defined as the probability that
central bank does what it has promised before. [20]Blinder(1999) called this notion
of credibility ”matching deeds to words”. Denote central bank credibility as η, by
our definition, people attach probability η to the event that the central bank commits
to its original plan and probability 1− η to the event that the central bank defaults
on its promise and reoptimizes policy. Previously, the central bank is assumed to
have either full commitment or discretion. Using our definition, it means the central
bank credibility η equal to 1 or 0 respectively. In general, this notion enables us
to look into cases in between the two extremes by assuming imperfect credibility.
With rational expectation, private agents contemplate the policy announcement and
take into account the possibility of a policy reevaluation when formulating expected
inflation.
Alternatively, the notion of credibility here can be seen as the probability that a
specific central bank regime keeps in office every time period. Consider a sequence of
government regimes. Each regime is assumed to be able to commit perfectly. When a
regime takes office, it will not consider promises made by its predecessor, and instead
commit to its own policy plan until gets replaced by a new regime. A new regime
taking office is equivalent to a policy reoptimization. At each time period, the current
regime will be decided whether to keep in office or be replaced next period by an i.i.d
Bernoulli draw. In our context, the current regime will keep in office with probability
η. Therefore the duration or tenure of each regime is random with mean 1
1−η . Each
regime is making a policy plan over its random horizon with full commitment. This
interpretation of imperfect credibility draws inspiration from [80]Roberds(1987). He
is the first to introduce the concept of stochastic replanning in order to address the
’commitment vs discretion’ problem in monetary policy study.
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This interpretation of credibility is useful because it can be observed in real life.
[32]Cukierman(1992) documented the turnover rate of central bank governors 2 and
used it as a proxy for central bank independence. More rapid turnover of central bank
governors indicates a lower level of independence. He detected a two-way causality
between inflation and central bank independence within the group of developing as
well of industrial countries. Intuitively, high inflation pressure encourages politicians
to get involved in monetary policy. Thus inflation is a potential causing factor for
regime changes. Based on this empirical evidence, this paper assumes central bank
credibility depends on inflation. Specifically, credibility is a function of historical in-
flations, ηt = η(pit−1). Then the model looks into optimal monetary policy design with
credibility interacting with past inflation policy plan. The derivative of credibility,
∂ηt
∂pit−1
measures the sensitivity of central bank credibility to lag inflation. A greater
sensitivity suggests central bank credibility is more vulnerable.
This paper analyzes optimal monetary policy in the New Keynesian Framework3
with imperfect credibility setting. We refer to the NK monetary policy model in a
linear quadratic form to approximate the richer macroeconomic dynamics in medium-
scale policy models. Credibility is affected by past inflation, thus central banks will
take into account the impact of inflation policy on expected inflation and expected
welfare loss via changes in credibility. The paper finds that central bank with sensitive
credibility has the incentive to make tougher inflation policy to improve credibility.
Such incentive is intensified when a cost-push shock hits the economy. Inflation
becomes more volatile compared to inflation policy made by central banks with in-
sensitive credibility. In general, such volatility cannot be fully compensated by the
improvement of credibility. Therefore, central bank with a sensitive credibility gen-
erates more welfare loss.
2The central bank governor’s turnover rate is defined as the average number of changes per
annum. It equals to the inverse of tenure or 1− η.
3[87] Woodford (2005) has a detailed description of the New Keynesian Model.
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There are alternative ways to model central bank behavior. One line of literature
adopts a game theoretical approach. [29]Chari and Kehoe (1990) analyze credible
government policy with a trigger model. Central banks are trustworthy because a
deviation from commitment will trigger a reversion to bad equilibrium. The bad
equilibrium consequences work as a credible threat for central bank to commit. In
reputation literature4, government can be either trustworthy or opportunistic. The
types of government are unobserved. Trustworthy government will never default.
Opportunistic government can pretend to be the trustworthy type to accumulate
reputation before its default. Reputation, as a state variable in government’s value
function, is private agents’ posterior belief that government is the trustworthy type.
Credibility, the probability that the government will confiscate or default in current
period, is the government’s mix strategy. In Markov Perfect Equilibrium, the repu-
tation model has a sustainable plan in which both types of government act honestly.
[81]Schaumburg and Tamballoti (2007) modeled credibility in a Calvo style. Instead
of using the game theoretical approach, they assume central bank will commit with an
exogenous probability. This probability is defined to be central bank credibility. So,
credibility is not chosen by central bank as a mix strategy in a game with the public.
But rather, it is private sector’s perception on the central bank’s ability to remain in
office and commit to its plan. They built a NK model with exogenous credibility and
investigated the gain from commitment across different levels of credibility.
This chapter follows [81]Schaumburg and Tamballoti (2007) approach to model
central bank behavior and extends their model by making credibility endogenously
determined. Now, the perception of central bank’s ability to commit is assumed to
be varying over time with overall economic conditions. This new assumption enriches
central bank’s short-term tradeoff. Whenever central bank wants to inflate money, it
will be facing loses from two aspects: one, short term inflation is destabilized, two,
4such as [27]Celentani and Pesendorfer(1996)
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a credibility loss which affects the present value of welfare tomorrow and expected
inflation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the NK
model with imperfect credibility setting. I incorporate the new credibility setting into
a simple NK model. In section 3, I define the equilibrium and provide some intuition
on key steps towards solving the model. In section 4, I solve the model numerically
and show the result. I also consider the dynamics of key variables in presence of a
cost-push shock. In section 5, I conclude.
3.1 Model
3.1.1 The New Keynesian Policy Model
In the standard NK monetary policy model, central bank minimizes the present dis-
count value of welfare loss,
min
{yt,pit}t=∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtL(pit, yt). (3.1)
L(pit, yt) is the loss function depending on inflation pit and output gap yt. The Loss
function always takes a linear quadratic form,
L(pit, yt) = pi
2
t + θ(yt − y∗)2 (3.2)
with θ > 0. y∗ is the output gap target. This form is derived as an approximation
of the second order approximation to the utility of a representative agent.5 Central
bank minimizes total welfare loss taking into account private sector optimal price-
setting behavior under Calvo pricing. The private sector behavior can be summarized
5A derivation of the approximation can be found in Woodford (2003) or Gali (2008) .
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by a forward-looking Phillips curve,
pit = κyt + βEtpit+1 + ut (3.3)
for each time period t. β is the subjective discount factor of private sector, as same as
the discount factor for central bank. κ depends on structural parameters, including
the parameter for Calvo pricing. The cost-push shock ut follows an i.i.d. normal
distribution.
3.1.2 Imperfect Credibility
As defined in previous section, credibility is the probability that the central bank
does what it promised. This “matching deeds to words” definition is first advocated
by Blinder(1998). At each time period t, private sector assigns a probability to
the event that current monetary policy plan will be abandoned next period and
form expectation about future economic performances accordingly. The probability
reflects private agents perception on central bank’s ability to commit, so it measures
the credibility of central bank. Denote ηt as central bank credibility at time t. ηt is
the probability that the central bank is committed at time t. 1− ηt is the probability
that central bank defaults on its promises.
Alternatively, the probability ηt can be interpreted under stochastic replanning
context in [80]Roberds(1987). Consider central bank consists of infinitely many
regimes. Each of the central bank regime can fully commit to its own plan but it is
subject to regime changes. At the time when current regime is removed from office
and a new regime is assigned to office, the new regime will abandon promises made
by its predecessor and make a new policy plan. So, ηt can be seen as the probability
that current central bank regime stays in office at current time period t. 1−ηt can be
seen as that the central bank regime is removed and a new regime is taking office and
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remaking policy plans. When private agents think the current central bank regime is
fully trustworthy, ηt = 1. When private agents think the current central bank regime
will be removed, or the policy plan will be reoptimized by a newly assigned central
bank regime, ηt = 0. In reality, people assign only a probability to the event that
central bank commits to what it announced. This suggests that central banks have
some ability to commit but are not fully trustworthy. When central banks have im-
perfect credibility, ηt ∈ (0, 1). In the case of United States, since the seven members
of the Board of Governors are nominated by the U.S President, as political party in
power changes over time, the composition of views in the FOMC can be varying over
time too.
Imperfect credibility indicates that the current central bank regime will keep in
office at time t with probability ηt ∈ [0, 1]. So each central bank regime faces some
probability of being removed. This means, each regime is expected to have a finite
tenure. It considers monetary policy plan only within a finite horizon. Define central
bank governor’ turnover rate as the average number of changes per annum. So,
turnover rate equals 1− ηt. [32]Cukierman(1992) documented central bank turnover
rates during forty years ending in 1989 for developing and developed countries. In the
developed country groups, central bank turnover rate ranges from 0.03 to 0.2, with an
average of 0.135 in 1980’s . In developing country groups, the central bank credibility
ranges from 0.13 to 0.93, with an average of 0.287 within the same period. So generally
speaking, central banks in developed countries have longer tenures than those in
developing countries. He studied the relation between central bank turnover rate and
lag inflation. A two-way causality between inflation and turnover was detected within
the group of developing as well of developed countries. Specifically, one period lag
inflation positively affected current turnover rate and current turnover rate reinforces
inflation as well.
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Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) used the probability ηt as a measure of cred-
ibility and assumes that credibility is an exogenous parameter and is constant over
time. They used a specific type of technology endowed by central bank regimes to
support their assumption. Such technology is called quasicommitment technology. It
guarantees that each regime can credibly commit to a state-contingent plan for the
entire duration of its tenure, but cannot constrain the actions of its successors. In
their paper, the technology is constant over time.
This paper assumes that central bank credibility is varying over time with eco-
nomic performances. The study by [32]Cukierman(1992) provides us with the empir-
ical evidence to support the endogenous credibility assumption. Intuitively, in times
of higher inflation, central banks are often suffering more skeptics and criticism than
in normal times. People tend to be more conservative. They will question current
regime’s ability to rein in inflation. When central bank’s reputation is tarnished by
high inflation, its authority would be reduced vis-a-vis the Treasury. So high infla-
tion pressure encourages politicians to get involved in monetary policy. Changes in
political environment can affect central bank turnover rate, as is the case for many
developing countries. In Argentina, the legal charter of central bank is not bind-
ing restrictedly. Actual turnover of their central bank governors may be affected by
inflationary pressures.
Let credibility ηt be a function of one-period lag inflation, ηt = η(pit−1). Empirical
evidence suggests that η′(pit−1) < 0. For simplicity, consider credibility is a linear
function of lag inflation,
ηt = c0 + c1pit−1 (3.4)
with c1 ≤ 0. Each time period, the central bank will commit with probability ηt and
will default with probability 1− ηt. When inflation increases, central bank credibility
is deteriorated, the probability of committing next period ηt+1 drops. c1 measures
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the effect of lag inflation on credibility ηt, indicating the sensitivity of central bank
credibility to past inflation. As c1 is further way from zero, central bank credibility
will be more vulnerable. A small increase in inflation will induce a larger impact on
the credibility.
Under the new assumption, central bank forms a new objective at time 0:
V (u0) = min{yt,pit}
E0[
∞∑
t=0
βt(Πτ=tτ=0ητ )L(pit, yt)+
∞∑
t=0
βt+1(Πτ=tτ=0ητ )(1−ηt+1)V (ut+1)]. (3.5)
V (u0) is the value function of the initial central bank regime with cost push shock u0.
L(pi0, y0) is the welfare loss at date 0. Assume η0 = 1. The regime considers policy rule
for an infinite horizon to minimize expected welfare loss. The minimization problem
consists of two summations. The first summation is the total welfare loss when this
regime survives throughout the infinite horizon and carries out its policy plan. At
each time period t, the regime remains in office with a probability (Πτ=tτ=0ητ ). So the
welfare loss L(pit, xt) is discounted by β
t(Πτ=tτ=0ητ ). The second summation is the sum
of all possible defaults. V (ut+1) denotes the value function of a new regime taking
office at time period t+1. Equivalently speaking, it is the value function when the
central bank defaults on its promises and reoptimizes. The probability of such event
is (Πτ=tτ=0ητ )(1 − ηt+1). Combining the common terms, equation(5) can be simplified
as
V (u0) = min{yt,pit}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt(Πτ=tτ=0ητ )[L(pit, yt) + β(1− ηt+1)V (ut+1)]. (3.6)
Under our assumption, the one-step-ahead inflation expectation can be expressed
as
Etpit+1 = ηt+1Et[pit+1|commit] + (1− ηt+1)Et[piRt+1|discretion]. (3.7)
Note that credibility ηt+1 is a linear function of pit, so it is known at time t. Condi-
tioning on central bank will commit next period, people expect inflation policy pit+1.
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Conditioning on central bank will default on its promises, people expect a reopti-
mization policy plan piRt+1. pi
R
t+1 ∈ argminV (ut+1), so piRt+1 can be seen as the inflation
policy plan made by a new regime taking office at time t+1. Since piRt+1 would be
the same regardless of which regime takes office, piRt+1 only depends on the cost-push
shock at time t. The forward-looking Phillips curve takes the form
pit = κyt + βηt+1Et[pit+1|commit] + β(1− ηt+1)Et[piRt+1|discretion] + ut. (3.8)
Therefore the central bank’s objective is a time-0 problem, which can be written
as the following:
V (u0) = min{yt,pit}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt(Πtτ=0ητ )[pi
2
t + θ(yt − y∗)2 + β(1− ηt+1)V (ut+1)]. (3.9)
subject to
ηt = c0 + c1pit−1,
pit = κyt + βηt+1Et[pit+1|commit] + β(1− ηt+1)Et[piRt+1|discretion] + ut,
ut are exogenous i.i.d shocks,
Because of the forward-looking constraint, the problem does not have a recursive
form directly. But it can have an alternative recursive form as a Saddle Point Func-
tional Equation using Marcet and Marimon(1998) method. First, the problem can
be constructed as a Lagrangean:
L = max
λt
min
yt,pit
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt(Πtτ=0ητ ){pi2t + θ(yt − y∗)2 + β(1− ηt+1)V (ut+1)
+2λt(κyt + βηt+1Et[pit+1|commit] + β(1− ηt+1)Et[piRt+1|discretion] + ut − pit)}
(3.10)
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subject to
ηt = c0 + c1pit−1,
ut are exogenous shocks.
2βt(Πtτ=0ητ )λt is the Lagrange multiplier. Lagrange multiplier indicates the marginal
value of relaxing its corresponding constraint. In this context, the multiplier indicates
the marginal welfare gain when central bank succumbs to the temptation of default
and re-evaluates its policy. Since piRt+1 only depends on the cost-push shock ut+1 at
time t+1, Et[pi
R
t+1|discretion] is a constant and does not depend on time t. So we can
denote Et[pi
R
t+1|discretion] as piR. By law of iterated expectations, the Lagrangean
can be simplified as a expression taking expectation at time 0 only. So,
L = max
λt
min
yt,pit
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt(Πtτ=0ητ ){pi2t + θ(yt − y∗)2 + β(1− ηt+1)V (ut+1)
+2λt[κyt + βηt+1pit+1 + β(1− ηt+1)piR + ut − pit]}.
(3.11)
Treat the term βηt+1pit+1 separately at the end, we have
L = max
λt
min
yt,pit
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt(Πtτ=0ητ ){pi2t + θ(yt − y∗)2 + β(1− ηt+1)V (ut+1)
+2λt[κyt + β(1− ηt+1)piR + ut − pit]}+
∞∑
t=0
βt+1(Πt+1τ=0ητ )λtpit+1.
(3.12)
By assuming λ−1 = 0 and combining two summations, we can have
L = max
λt
min
yt,pit
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt(Πtτ=0ητ ){pi2t + θ(yt − y∗)2 + β(1− ηt+1)V (ut+1)
+2λt(κyt + β(1− ηt+1)piR + ut − pit) + 2λt−1pit}.
(3.13)
Now we have a regular objective function with a non-forward-looking constraint,
we are ready to reformulate it as a recursive form, which is called a Saddle Point
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Functional Equation in Marcet and Marimon (1998).
W (γt, ut) = max
λt
min
yt,pit
{pi2t + θ(yt − y∗)2 + β(1− ηt+1)EtV (ut+1)
+2λt(κyt + β(1− ηt+1)piR + ut − pit) + 2λt−1pit + βηt+1EtW (γt+1, ut+1)}
(3.14)
subject to
ηt = c0 + c1pit−1,
γt = λt−1,
λ−1 = γ0 = 0,
ut are exogenous shocks.
Cost-push shock ut is the exogenous state variable. λt is the Lagrange multiplier for
central bank date-0 problem. Now, one period lag of the Lagrange multiplier, i.e.,
λt−1 = γt, is an endogenous state variable for the recursive problem. λt−1 summarizes
all outstanding promises central bank made. When central bank solves maximiza-
tion problem today, it has to take into account the promises he made in the past
throughout his tenure. When new central bank regime takes office, it does not need
to consider promises made by its predecessor and it will re-do the date-0 problem, so
in this case, λt−1 = 0. At time 0, there is no outstanding promises, so we are able to
assume λ−1 = γ0 = 0.
W (γt+1, ut+1) is the continuation value if the central bank commits next period.
V (ut+1) is the value for next period if the central bank defaults. When central bank
defaults on all outstanding promises on time period t+ 1,the new regime will do the
date-0 problem all over again, so γt+1 = 0 and EtV (ut+1) = EtW (0, ut+1). Similarly,
piR = Et[pi
R
t+1|discretion] = Etpi(0, ut+1).
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3.2 Equilibrium
Definition. The equilibrium in imperfect credibility setting needs to satisfy the
following conditions:
1. Given rules for piR and V , sequence {yt} and {pit} solve the above problem.
2. The value function is such that V (ut) = W (0, ut).
3. The policy function is such that piRt = pi(0, ut).
Now, taking first order conditions of the problem, we obtain, for all time period t
yt = −κ
θ
λt + y
∗ (3.15)
pit = λt(1 + βη
′(pit)piR)− λt−1 − 1
2
βη′(pit)(EtWt+1(γt+1, ut+1)− EtV (ut+1)) (3.16)
pit = κyt + β(η(pit)Etpit+1 + (1− η(pit))piR) + ut (3.17)
These equations describe the evolution of endogenous variable pit,yt and ηt. Equa-
tion (3.15) comes from the first order condition with respect to yt for fixed Lagrange
multiplier λt, from which we can get
λt = − θ
κ
(yt − y∗) (3.18)
Since parameters θ, κ > 0, Lagrange multiplier is negatively related to the deviation
of output from its target. Whenever output is below its target, Lagrange multiplier is
positive, suggesting that there is a gain from relaxing the forward-looking constraint
by surprising people. Central bankers are tempted to abandon past policy plan and
reoptimize in order to boost economy in the short term. The gain from reoptimization
increases as output is further way from its target. So the Lagrange multiplier describes
the degree of temptation current central banker is facing. Note that one-period-lag
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Lagrange multiplier enters today’s value function as a state variable. Lag multiplier
indicates the temptation central banker was facing last period. It also summarizes
policy plans the central banker made last period. Central bank makes policy today
taking into account the outstanding promises made last period, so today’s policy
is a function of lag multiplier. Once central bank reoptimizes, it discards all past
promises, so lag multiplier is reset to zero.
Equation (3.16) comes from the first order condition with respect to pit for fixed
Lagrange multiplier λt. Consider the special case of c1 = 0, where ηt = c0 + c1pit−1.
Credibility level ηt = c0 ∈ (0, 1].6 This is the case Schaumburg and Tambalotti(2007)
considered. Then
pit = λt − λt−1. (3.19)
Left-hand side is marginal loss from a linear quadratic loss function. Right-hand
side is the marginal gain from relaxing the current forward-looking constraint. When
central bank raises inflation by one percent, the marginal loss from high inflation, pit,
and the marginal gain of reoptimization, λt − λt−1, must be equalized.
Equation(3.16) describes the general case
∂ηt
∂pit−1
= c1 ≤ 0. (3.20)
The trade-off becomes
pit+
1
2
βη′(pit)(EtWt+1(γt+1, ut+1)−EtV (ut+1)) = λt(1+βη′(pit)EtpiRt+1)−λt−1. (3.21)
The marginal loss has two sources now. First, same as before, inflation volatility
incurs a loss in welfare by the given linear quadratic form. Second, credibility plays a
role here. Change in inflation leads to change in credibility. As a consequence, it will
affect the way central bank discounts one-period-ahead value functions of commitment
6Note that our problem does not apply to the case when central bank is discretion.
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versus reoptimization. When EtWt+1(γt+1, ut+1)−EtV (ut+1) ≥ 0, total marginal loss
is partially compensated by the deterioration of future credibility associated with the
delta increase in inflation. The reason is that as next period credibility drops, we
weigh value of reoptimization,EtV (ut+1), relatively more than on EtW (γt+1, ut+1).
Since value of reoptimization is smaller, central bank tilts their weight to the smaller
welfare loss, so expected loss in total decreases. Similarly for EtWt+1(γt+1, ut+1) −
EtV (ut+1) ≤ 0. The marginal gain side of the equation summarizes a gain from
succumbing to the temptation today. The coefficient for λt is 1 + βη
′(pit)EtpiRt+1 ≤ 1
with η′(pit) ≤ 0. So current temptation to reformulate policy is discounted due to
the additional negative effect of inflation on inflation expectation. As inflation today
increases by delta, and next period credibility drops, private agent will attach more
probability on the inflation in reoptimized policy, piRt+1. So even if central bank intends
to carry out a disinflationary policy, they will win a relatively less favorable Phillips
curve trade-off due to their limited ability to control inflation expectation.
3.3 Result Analysis
3.3.1 Solution Algorithm
The linear quadratic structure no longer holds with endogenous credibility. So un-
fortunately, there is no closed-form solution. Instead, the paper uses Value Function
Iteration to solve the model numerically. The basic algorithm is summarized as the
following:
1. Make an initial guess for value function W (γt, ut) and reoptimized inflation
policy piR(ut). Then get the guess for V (ut) by taking state variable γt equal to
zero.
2. Use first order conditions to express pit and yt using state variables (γt , ut) and
choice variable λt.
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3. Now we have a minimization problem
W¯ (γt, ut) = min
λt
{
pi(λt, γt, ut)
2 + θ(y(λt, γt, ut)− y∗)2
+ β (1− η(pi(λt, γt, ut)))EtV (ut+1) + βη(pi(λt, γt, ut)
)
EtW (γt+1, ut+1)
+ 2λt
(
κy(λt, γt, ut) + β(1− η(pi(λt, γt, ut)))EtpiRt+1 + ut − pi(λt, γt, ut)
)
+ 2λt−1pi(λt, γt, ut)
(3.22)
subject to the same constraints as before.
4. Updating guesses for value function W (γt, ut) and reoptimized inflation policy
piR(ut) by solving the minimization problem until convergence.
3.3.2 Calibration
The benchmark calibration follows Woodford (2003a, Table 6.1). The value of output
gap target, y∗, and the standard deviation of the cost-push shock, σ, follows Schaum-
burg and Tambalotti (2007). Note that the value for y∗ is chosen with some freedom
since it does not affect impulse response dynamics and has only level effect on policy
functions. We takes y∗ the same value as in Schaumburg and Tambalotti(2007) in
order to have a direct comparison with their results. The basic parameterization of
our model is summarized in Table 3.1. All parameters are in terms of quarters.
Table 3.1: Parameterization
Parameter Value Economic meaning
β 0.99 Discount factor
θ 0.048 Weight on output in welfare loss function
κ 0.1 Slope of Phillips curve
y∗ 0.1 Natural level of output gap
The parameters which have almost no guidance provided are the parameters for
central bank credibility, c0 and c1. The value of credibility is lack in monetary policy
literature because there is not yet consensus on the definition of credibility. This paper
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takes the notion of central bank credibility to be the probability that central bank
will commit to its plan. Alternatively, assume central bank consists of infinitely many
central bank regimes and each of the regime can fully commit to its plan. Then central
bank credibility is the probability that current central bank regime will stay in power
next period. From this perspective, central bank credibility is linked to central bank
governors’ turnover rates. [32]Cukierman(1992) documented central bank governor
turnover rates from 1950 to 1989 for a wide range of counties. Developed countries
tend to have lower turnover rate than developing counties. For example, United States
has an annually turnover rate of 0.25 from 1972 to 1979. From 1980 to 1989, Chile
and Brazil central bank have an annually turnover rate of 0.8. In our model, that
means, United States central bank has a credibility level of 0.93 quarterly, which is
higher than the central bank credibility in India, with a level of 0.67 quarterly. This
paper takes quarterly parameter c0 = 0.75 in the benchmark case.
7
The credibility is assumed to be a linear deterministic function of past inflation,
i.e.,
ηt+1 = 0.75 + c1pit, (3.23)
where c1 ≤ 0, suggesting that inflation has a negative effect on credibility next period.
When c1 = 0, credibility is exogenously given. It is the assumption in Shaumburg
and Tambalotti (2007). When c1 < 0, a small increase in inflation will lead to a
large decrease in central bank credibility. So c1 can be interpreted as the degree of
sensitivity of central bank credibility to economic performances. Here we consider
two cases, i.e., c1 = 0 and -4.
8
7c0 is chosen to be lower than empirical fact for many countries to fit in [0, 1] interval for credibility
level.
8These values are random choices only for a qualitative illustration. The value of sensitivity is
lack of empirical evidence.
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3.3.3 Policy function
Each central bank regime makes policy plan taking into account the probability that
it will be removed next period. The policy rules for Lagrange multiplier, output,
inflation and credibility are plotted in Figure 3·1. In this figure, we assume there is
no cost-push shock, policy rules are functions of lag multiplier λt−1. We plot policy
rules as function of lag output yt−1 because it is a monotonic transformation of the
state variable λt−1.
Figure 3·1: Policy functions
Top left panel plots the policy rule of Lagrange multiplier. Lagrange multiplier
measures central bank’s temptation to default. It is a decreasing function of output
last period. A recession last period raises central bank’s incentive to default in order
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to boost economy this period. By FOC with respect to output, output today is a
linear function of Lagrange multiplier with a negative coefficient. So as is shown
in the top right panel, output policy rule is increasing with lag output. During
recession, central bank behaves like a fully committed regime. To show the public its
goodwill to commit to its promise, the central bank chooses a slow convergent path
back to steady state to smooth out recession. Note that the output steady state is
slightly negative. The reason is that the public expect a central bank default with
certain probability each period, so central bank needs to commit to a negative output
policy to control output expectation. As the sensitivity of credibility to inflation (i.e.,
c1) rises, changes in multiplier policy function is somewhat negligible. By Equation
(3.15), output functions almost overlap as well. So credibility sensitivity does not
affect output policy much.
The bottom left panel plots inflation policy. It shows that as c1 rises, inflation
policy has more curvature. During recession, central bank has strong temptation
(measured by λt) to default. The public is aware of central bank’s temptation. To
fight public skeptics, central bank is eager to maintain its high credibility by making
tough inflation policy as in a highly committed regime. When economy is overheated,
inflation hikes. Central bank will suffer an absolute loss in credibility. Central bank
wants to control inflation and to regain credibility, so inflation policy is tougher
than when central bank has an exogenous credibility. Note that the inflation policy
function is concave with endogenous credibility. During output recession, inflation
policy function is steeper for credibility sensitivity c1 = −4. It means, to decrease
inflation by a certain amount, central bank with sensitive credibility achieves it with
less depression for output. Central bank with c1 = −4 is more efficient in controlling
inflation. Similarly, during economic boom, inflation policy function is steeper for
central bank with exogenous credibility. Central bank with c1 = 0 is more efficient in
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controlling inflation. The reason for that is depicted in bottom right panel. Bottom
right panel in Figure 3·1 plots the outcome of credibility when central bank makes
its inflation policy plan. The current central banker intends to maintain credibility
during recession. So, central bank with credibility sensitivity attach more importance
on credibility to win a favorable Phillips curve trade-off. It will be more efficient
in controlling inflation. Similarly, in booming period, central bank with sensitive
credibility suffers from a credibility loss. It has stronger incentive to rein in inflation.
So the credibility loss is partially alleviated by its tougher inflation policy. But still,
it is less efficient in containing inflation.
Each period, the public take central bank’s promises into account, meanwhile
contemplate the possibility that central bank will default. So expected inflation and
output next period can be written as
Etpit+1 = ηt+1Et[pit+1|commit] + (1− ηt+1)piR. (3.24)
Etyt+1 = ηt+1Et[yt+1|commit] + (1− ηt+1)[yt+1|discretion]. (3.25)
So Figure 3·2 plots expected output and inflation next period as a function of
output this period. The shape of inflation policy function is “roughly preserved”
in inflation evolution. The reason is that the expected inflation as a function of
current output is a re-scale of the inflation policy function by ηt+1 (which varies
with different yt) and then an upward shift by (1 − ηt+1)piR . Expected output
exihibits more curvature. During recession, central bank with sensitive credibility
aims at gaining credibility by making tougher inflation policy plan. So taking into
account the default possibility, people expect a smoother convergence path back to
output steady state. During booms, central bank with sensitive credibility again pays
more attention to control inflation in order to control loss from credibility. People
expect a lower inflation. Because of a credibility loss of central bank, people expect
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Figure 3·2: Output and Inflation Evolution
a faster convergence back to steady state output. Note that when recession or boom
is moderate, central bank with vulnerable credibility suffers from credibility loss.
However, as shown in Figure 3·1, it does not have strong enough incentive to depress
inflation more so as to improve credibility. Central bank weighs gain in current
economy stability more over a reduction of credibility loss. So if people perceive
central bank credibility is vulnerable to changes in inflation, they will expect a slightly
higher level of inflation tomorrow within the range of moderate recession and boom.
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3.3.4 Impulse Response Analysis
Next, the paper analyzes the dynamics of key economic variables after a cost-push
shock. Consider a shock process of
ut =

0.0163, t = 0
0, t ≥ 1.
(3.26)
The paper considers three types of comparison. First, compare endogenous cred-
ibility model with exogenous credibility. Then, in order to separate the effect of
credibility constant c0 and the effect of credibility sensitivity c1, we fix credibility
constant c0 = 0.75 and vary credibility sensitivity c1. Lastly, we do the opposite, fix
credibility sensitivity c1 = −2 and vary credibility constant c0.
First, the paper compares the imperfect credibility model with full credibility.
That is, consider ηt = 0.5 v.s. ηt = 1. The dynamic paths for both cases are plotted
in Figure 3·3.
We find that imperfect credibility does not change inflation response much com-
pared to full credibility case, while output exhibits a clear deeper and longer recession.
So, an imperfect exogenous credibility generates a welfare loss. This result is consis-
tent with the findings of Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007).
Now comparing endogenous central bank credibility with the exogenous bench-
mark, i.e., i.e., c1 = −5 and 0. We find that after a cost-push shock, central bank
with endogenous credibility will further extend and deepen the output recession. On
top of that, endogenous credibility induces a tougher inflation policy. The drop in
inflation is significant. The recovery paths for output and inflation are always below
the paths for exogenous credibility. So, welfare loss is exacerbated. Even though a
tougher monetary stance generates a hike in credibility, as is shown in the bottom
panel, which helps ease the trade-off between inflation and output, central bank with
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Figure 3·3: Impulse Response functions for full and partial credibility
sensitive credibility generally makes economy suffer a deeper and longer recession.
At time 0, the cost-push shock lifts inflation and triggers an initial drop in output.
As credibility sensitivity c1 rises, the negative impact on output is greater. The
reason is that at the time when a cost push shock hits the economy, central banks
with vulnerable credibility (i.e., c1 < 0) suffer credibility losses. Credibility drops,
as shown in the bottom panel. Central bank has to depress output more to mitigate
the rise in inflation expectation. The initial depression of output is stronger for cases
with greater credibility loss, i.e., for central banks with more sensitive credibility.
In general, central bank with sensitive credibility generates a deeper and pro-
tracted disinflation along with the deeper output recession. By assumption, when
c1 < 0, disinflationary policy can help build credibility. Central banks with sensi-
tive credibility need to weigh future credibility gain against loss from stability today.
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Figure 3·4: Impulse Response functions for endogenous credibility
With credibility responsive to inflation, they generally have more incentive to depress
inflation, so inflation drops deeper. As shown in the bottom panel, immediately af-
ter initial cost-push shock, central bank with high c1 quickly builds up credibility
by making toughest inflation policy, then the credibility level gradually goes back to
steady state.
As mentioned above, in order to separate the effect of credibility constant c0
and the effect of credibility sensitivity c1, lastly, the paper compares the endogenous
credibility with same degree of credibility sensitivity and different values for c0. So
ηt = c0 − 2pit−1 (3.27)
where c0 = 0.9, 0.75 and 0.5. Figure 3·5 plots the policy function for these three
cases. Notice that when lag output is large, inflation and output policy rules for
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Figure 3·5: Policy function with different constants
three different credibility constant c0 tend to converge to the same point. While
when lag output is low, higher central bank credibility constant c0 gives relatively
higher output policy. In another word, the output policy is flatter for higher c0. It
suggests that the speed of convergence is higher for higher credibility constant. But
notice that higher credibility constant also gives higher steady state output policy.
So it is indeterminant that starting from a given recession, which type of central
bank will converge to its own steady state the fastest. As for inflation policy, all
three cases have concavity. The inflation policy function has a deepest slope point-
wise for highest credibility constant. For same decrease for inflation, the curve with
deepest slope has smallest decrease in output. So central bank with higher credibility
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constant can curb inflation by generating less output recession. Central bank with
higher level of credibility will be more efficient in controlling inflation. All three curves
are concave because when the economy is overheated, central bank credibility in all
cases are impaired by high inflation, as is shown clearly in the bottom right panel.
With lower credibility, central banks become less efficient to control inflation.
Figure 3·6: Impulse response for different credibility constants
Figure 3·6 plots the dynamic paths for different credibility constants. The paper
finds that different credibility constants c0 generates almost the same response for
inflation, except that the case with lowest credibility constant tends to have the
slowest convergence of inflation back to steady state. The dynamics of credibility, as
a function of lag inflation, behave almost the same as well. As for output dynamics,
in the case of lower credibility constant, central bank is perceived as having the least
ability to control inflation. A deeper drop in output is needed initially. Output
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convergence paths almost parallel to each other. Central bank with different c0’s will
not differ much in inflation response of a cost-push shock but central bank with lower
c0 will generate significantly deeper and longer output recession.
In this subsection, we plot dynamic paths for key economic variables after a cost-
push shock. Result suggests that with endogenous credibility, the economy suffers
deep and protracted recession. The paper compares different cases for the purpose of
isolating effect of credibility constant from the effect of credibility sensitivity. Main
finding is that credibility constant c0 tends to prolong output recession after a cost-
push shock. Credibility sensitivity c1 contributes to a deeper initial depression on
output and inflation and further prolongs the recession. Two factors combined gener-
ate a worse recession after a cost-push shock compared with the perfect commitment
case.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper analyzes optimal monetary policy design with imperfect credibility. Cen-
tral bank credibility is defined as the probability that central bank commits to its
announced policy path. This is the notion of credibility advocated by Blinder (1998).
The notion of credibility can be empirically related to central bank governor’s turnover
rate if we are willing to assume that each composition of central bank governors forms
a committed central bank regime. Shaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) set up an im-
perfect credibility model to analyze the welfare gain from commitment. This paper
extends their work by considering central bank optimal behavior when its credibility
is influenced by overall economic performances. A statistically significant two-way
causality between past inflation and central bank turnover rate found by Cukierman
(1992) supports our assumption of endogenous credibility.
In our model, central bank confronts a multidimensional output inflation trade-
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off. The original short-term trade-off is enriched via the credibility channel. When
inflation is above steady state level, economy suffers a loss from price stability. More-
over, as credibility is impaired by inflation, private agents will re-adjust their weights
in discounting future welfare loss. So, a long-term perspective is introduced into the
inflation and output tradeoff. Meanwhile, the short-term gain from a policy reevalua-
tion will also change due to the change in inflation expectation. They combined tends
to encourage a tougher monetary stance. So with a cost-push shock, central bank with
endogenous credibility depresses inflation and output to a greater extent compared to
the exogenous credibility benchmark. Main finding is that the credibility sensitivity
tends to magnify the initial depression and protract the recession after the shock. So
in general, although central bank is able to manipulate expectation through stronger
disinflation, there is still a greater welfare loss compared to a constant credibility.
This paper gives a qualitative study for central bank behavior when credibility
is endogenous. The linear functional form for credibility leaves room for future re-
finement. The credibility structure can be extended to include past credibility and
some nonlinear function of past inflation. Also, up-to-date empirical study of the
relation between central bank turnover rates and economic variables would be helpful
to support some quantitative implication of the model.
Appendices
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Appendix A
Chapter I: Asset Fire Sales and
Endogenous Volatility
A.1 Proof of corner solutions
With Assumption 1, U0(z; θ) reaches its maximum at the corners of θ.
proof The expected payoff of bank
U0(θ; z) =
1
2
λ
x(θ,1;z)∫
0
(1− x
p
)(1− cθ)(1 + θ)z − (1− x)R∗dx
+
1
2
λ
x(θ,−1;z)∫
0
(1− x
p
)(1− cθ)(1− θ)z − (1− x)R∗dx
+
1
2
(1− λ) max{(1− cθ)(1 + θ)z −R∗, 0}
+
1
2
(1− λ) max{(1− cθ)(1− θ)z −R∗, 0},
where x(θ, s; z) is the largest liquidity shock that would guarantee positive payoffs at
date 2 for banks given s,
x(θ, s; z) = min{
z − R∗
(1−cθ)(1+sθ)
z
p
− R∗
(1−cθ)(1+sθ)
, 1}.
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The marginal payoff in θ
∂U0(θ; z)
∂θ
=
1
2
z(1− c− 2cθ)
λ x(θ,1;z)∫
0
(1− x
p
)dx+ (1− λ)1{x(θ, 1; z) > 0}

+
1
2
z(−1− c+ 2cθ)
λ x(θ,−1;z)∫
0
(1− x
p
)dx+ (1− λ)1{x(θ,−1; z) > 0}
 .
Denote θ∗ satisfies that
z(1− cθ)(1− θ) = R∗.
For θ > θ∗, x(θ,−1; z) = 0. When taking risk θ > θ∗, the bank will default in negative
shocks at date 2. So for θ > θ∗, the marginal payoff in θ becomes ,
∂U0(θ; z)
∂θ
=
1
2
z(1− c− 2cθ)
λ x(θ,1;z)∫
0
(1− x
p
)dx+ (1− λ)1{x(θ, 1; z) > 0}

Given Assumption 1, for all p, the marginal payoff ∂U0(θ;z)
∂θ
is always positive for θ > θ∗.
Now consider the case θ < θ∗. For p > 1, x(z, s; θ) = 1 for s = 1 and −1. The
bank will not default as long as z ≥ R∗.
∂U0(θ; z)
∂θ
= −cz
λ 1∫
0
(1− x
p
)dx+ (1− λ)
 < 0.
For p ≤ 1, x(θ, s; z) < 1 for s = 1 and −1.
∂U0(θ; z)
∂θ
=− czλ
x(θ,−1;z)∫
0
(1− x
p
)dx− cz(1− λ)
+
1
2
z(1− c− 2cθ)λ
 x(θ,1;z)∫
x(θ,−1;z)
(1− x
p
)dx
 .
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Because x(θ, 1; z) is increasing in θ and x(θ,−1; z) is decreasing in θ, ∂U0(θ;z)
∂θ
is in-
creasing in θ for c sufficiently small. So there is no local maximum for θ < θ∗.
As shown previously, U0(θ; z) increases for θ > θ
∗.
By continuity of the U0(θ; z) in θ, θ = θ
∗ is not a local maximum. For θ = 0,
x(0,−1; z) = x(0, 1; z),
∂U0(θ; z)
∂θ
|θ=0 =− czλ
x(θ,−1;z)∫
0
(1− x
p
)dx− cz(1− λ) < 0.
So the optimal solution is either at 0 or 1.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1 (Optimal Choice of Risk)
(i) For p ≤ 1, for z > R∗,
U0(1; z) = (1− c)
(
z − R
∗
2(1− c)
)(
λ
2
xH(p,R
∗, z) + (1− λ)
)
U0(0; z) = (z −R∗)
(
λ
2
xL(p,R
∗, z) + (1− λ)
)
.
where xH(p,R
∗, z) and xL(p,R∗, z) are defined respectively as
xH(p,R
∗, z) =
z − R∗
2(1−c)
z
p
− R∗
2(1−c)
(A.1)
and
xL(p,R
∗, z) =
z −R∗
z
p
−R∗ . (A.2)
Otherwise, for z ≤ R∗, U0(z; 1) = U0(z; 0) = 0.
(ii) For p > 1, for z > R∗
U0(1; z) = (1− c)
(
z − R
∗
2(1− c)
)(
λ
2
+ (1− λ)
)
+ (1− c)λ
2
(1− 1
p
)z
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and
U0(0; z) = (z −R∗)
(
λ
2
+ (1− λ)
)
+
λ
2
(1− 1
p
)z.
Otherwise, for z ≤ R∗, U0(1; z) = U0(0; z) = 0.
A.3 Solving for z∗
(i) For p ≤ 1, for z > R∗, z∗ satisfies
(1−c)
(
z − R
∗
2(1− c)
)(
λ
2
xH(p,R
∗, z) + (1− λ)
)
= (z −R∗)
(
λ
2
xL(p,R
∗, z) + (1− λ)
)
.
Dividing both sides by R∗,
(1−c)
(
α− 1
2(1− c)
)(
λ
2
xH(p, 1, α) + (1− λ)
)
= (α− 1)
(
λ
2
xL(p, 1, α) + (1− λ)
)
.
The equation gives unique solution for α. z∗ = α(p)R∗.
A.4 Proof of the uniqueness of z∗
There are two steps to prove the existence of a unique z∗.
Step 1: z∗/R∗ ≥ 1
2c
.
Note that α(p) is first increasing then decreasing in p for p < 11, α(p) ≥ min{α(0), α(1)} =
1
2c
, then z∗ ≥ 1
2c
R∗.
Step 2: for z ≥ z∗ ≥ R∗/(2c), it can be shown that
∂U0(1; z)
∂z
<
∂U0(0; z)
∂z
.
Note that
∂U0(1; z)
∂z
= (1−c)
(
λ
2
xH(p,R
∗, z) + (1− λ)
)
+(1−c)
(
z − R
∗
2(1− c)
)
λ
2
∂xH(p,R
∗, z)
∂z
.
1as shown in Proposition 2
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and
∂U0(0; z)
∂z
=
(
λ
2
xL(p,R
∗, z) + (1− λ)
)
+ (z −R∗) λ
2
∂xL(p,R
∗, z)
∂z
.
To show ∂U0(1;z)
∂z
< ∂U0(0;z)
∂z
, we only need to show that holds for λ = 1. Then we
only need to show that (1− c)xH(p,R∗, z) < xL(p,R∗, z). It holds for all z > R∗2c .
(ii) For p > 1, z∗ satisfies
(1−c)
(
z − R
∗
2(1− c)
)(
λ
2
+ (1− λ)
)
+(1−c)λ
2
(1−1
p
)z = (z −R∗)
(
λ
2
+ (1− λ)
)
+
λ
2
(1−1
p
)z.
Dividing both sides by R∗,
(1−c)
(
α− 1
2(1− c)
)(
λ
2
+ (1− λ)
)
+(1−c)λ
2
(1−1
p
)α = (α− 1)
(
λ
2
+ (1− λ)
)
+
λ
2
(1−1
p
)α.
solving yields,
α =
1
2c
1
2
λ+ 1− λ
(1− 1
2p
)λ+ 1− λ.
Then, z∗ = α(p)R∗.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) For p > 1 it is trivial to prove that α(p) is decreasing in p.
(ii)For p ≤ 1, given R∗ = 1, z∗ = α(p). α(p) is the threshold mean return when
banks face no cost of borrowing.
∂z∗
∂p
= −
∂U(1;z∗)
∂p
− ∂U(0;z∗)
∂p
∂U(1;z∗)
∂z
− ∂U(0;z∗)
∂z
Because ∂U(1;z)
∂z
− ∂U(0;z)
∂z
< 0, for all z,
∂z∗
∂p
(
∂U(1; z∗)
∂p
− ∂U(0; z
∗)
∂p
)
> 0.
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Note that given R∗,
∂U(1; z∗)
∂p
− ∂U(0; z
∗)
∂p
=
λ
2
(
(1− c)(z∗ − R
∗
2(1− c))
∂x∗H
∂p
− (z∗ −R∗)∂x
∗
L
∂p
)
=
λ
2
z
p2
(
(1− c)x∗2H − x∗2L
)
where x∗H = xH(p,R
∗, z∗) and x∗L = xL(p,R
∗, z∗).
Because
√
1− cxH − xL =
√
1− c
z − R∗
2(1−c)
z
p
− R∗
2(1−c)
− z −R
∗
z
p
−R∗
=
√
1− c
(
z − R∗
2(1−c)
)(
z
p
−R∗
)
− (z −R∗)
(
z
p
− R∗
2(1−c)
)
(
z
p
− R∗
2(1−c)
)(
z
p
−R∗
)
The numerator is a quadratic and concave function in z. For z > R∗, there exists
a unique zˆ(p) that makes the numerator equal to zero. zˆ(p) is decreasing in p. At
p = 0, z∗(0, R∗) < zˆ(p) or equivalently
√
1− cx∗H−x∗L > 0. So z∗(p,R∗) is increasing.
Until p reaches p˜ that makes z∗(p,R∗) = zˆ(p), or equivalently
√
1− cx∗H − x∗L = 0.
After that, for p > p˜, z∗(p,R∗) > zˆ(p), or
√
1− cx∗H − x∗L < 0. That is, z∗(p,R∗)
decreases.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3 (The Existence of R∗)
a) At R∗ = r¯, R∗γd(p,R∗, z) = r¯γd(p, 1, z) ≤ r¯.
b) Given Assumption 2, at R∗ = 2(1 − c)z, the bank takes risk and can only obtain
payoffs when receive no early withdrawals x = 0. For p ≤ 1, R∗γd(p,R∗, z) =
(1− c)z(1− λ) > r¯. For p > 1, R∗γd(p,R∗, z) ≥ (1− c)z > r¯.
By continuity, there exists R∗ satisfy the participation constraint.
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A.7 Proof of Lemma
R∗(p, z) is decreasing in p. Total differentiating the depositors participation con-
straint:
∂R∗
∂p
= − R
∗ ∂γd
∂p
γd +R∗ ∂γ
d
∂R
< 0. (A.3)
A.8 Proof of Proposition 5
To prove the dominance of indirect effect for p < p˜, it is enough to show that
∂γd/γd
∂p/p
>
∂α/α
∂p/p
. (A.4)
Because ∂γ
d
∂p
1
γd
is increasing in p and ∂α
∂p
1
α
is decreasing in p, to prove the above
inequality, it is enough to show the inequality holds at p = 0,
Denote u0(θ;α) =
1
R∗U0(θ; z
∗). Total differentiating u0 with respect to p,
∂α
∂p
= −
∂u0(1;α)
∂p
− ∂u0(0;α)
∂p
∂u0(1;α)
∂α
− ∂u0(0;α)
∂α
As p approaches 0,
∂α
∂p
1
α
=
λ
1− λD(c),
with
D(c) = 2c
(
(1− c)( 1
2c
− 1
2(1− c))
2 − ( 1
2c
− 1)2
)
.
And
∂γd
∂p
1
γd
=

λ
1−λ
z− R∗
2(1−c)
z
if z < αR∗
λ
1−λ
z−R∗
z
if z ≥ αR∗.
With the assumption 3, (1− c)(1− λ)z > 1
1−D(c) , the inequality
∂α
∂p
1
α
<
∂γd
∂p
1
γd
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holds for all p.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 7
The expected payoffs in liquidity shocks with and without risk are expressed below
respectively,
UL0 (l, 1; z) =
1
2
ψ(p)∫
0
max
{
y(l, 1, x, 1; z), 0
}
dx
=
1
2
l∫
0
(1− l)2(1− c)z + (l − x)r¯ − (1− x)R∗
+
1
2
x∫
l
H,e(1− l − x− l
p
)2(1− c)z − (1− x)R∗
=(1− l)(1− c)zxH,e + l
2
4
r¯ − (1− c)z
2p
(xH,e − l)2 − (2− xH,e)xH,eR
∗
4
(A.5)
and
UL0 (l, 0; z) =
ψ(p)∫
0
max
{
y(l, 0, x, 1; z), 0
}
dx
=
l∫
0
(1− l)z + (l − x)r¯ − (1− x)R∗ +
xL,e∫
l
(1− l − x− l
p
)z − (1− x)R∗
=(1− l)zxL,e + l
2
2
r¯ − z
2p
(xL,e − l)2 − (2− xL,e)xL,eR
∗
2
(A.6)
Note that xH,e(l, p, R
∗, z) and xL,e(l, p, R∗, z) are defined respectively as
xH,e(l, p, R
∗, z) = min{
ψ(p,l)
p
z − R∗
2c
1
p
z − R∗
2c
, 1} (A.7)
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and
xL,e(l, p, R
∗, z) = min{
ψ(p,l)
p
z −R∗
1
p
z −R∗ , 1}. (A.8)
When the bank is not hit by liquidity shocks, the expected payoffs with and
without risk,
UNL0 (l, 1; z) =
1
2
y(l, 1, 0, 1; z)
=(1− c)
(
(1− l)z − R
∗
2(1− c)
)
+
1
2
lr¯,
(A.9)
and
UNL0 (l, 0; z) =
1
2
y(l, 0, 0, 1; z) +
1
2
y(l, 0, 0,−1; z)
=(1− l)z −R∗ + lr¯.
(A.10)
The expected payoffs are given by
U0(l, θ; z) = λU
L
0 (l, θ; z) + (1− λ)UNL0 (l, θ; z) (A.11)
where θ ∈ {0, 1}.
The threshold mean return is given by U0(l, 0; z) = U0(l, 1; z).
(i) For p > 1, it is easy to show that
z∗(l, p, R∗) =
1
2c
1
1− l
R∗ − λ l2
2
r¯ − (1− λ)lr¯
1− λ
2p
(1− l) .
The uniqueness of z∗ is easy to show because ∂U0(l,1;z)
∂z
< ∂U0(l,0;z)
∂z
for all z > R
∗−lr¯
1−l .
(ii) For p ≤ 1,
∂U0(l, 1; z)
∂z
− ∂U0(l, 0; z)
∂z
=(1− l)(λl + 1− λ)(−c)
+ λ(1− l)2
(
(1− c)xH − xL − 1
2p
(
(1− c)x2H − x2L
))
<0
where xH and xL are defined in the basic model. The inequality holds for λ small
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enough2. Then, there is a unique z∗ that solves the date 1 problem of the bank.
A.10 Proof of Lemma 4
z∗ is increasing in l. Taking derivative of z∗ with respect to l,
∂z∗
∂l
= −
∂U0(l,1;z∗)
∂l
− ∂U0(l,0;z∗)
∂l
∂U0(l,1;z∗)
∂z
− ∂U0(l,0;z∗)
∂z
. (A.12)
Since the denominator is negative (as shown previously),
∂z∗
∂l
(
∂U0(l, 1; z
∗)
∂l
− ∂U0(l, 0; z
∗)
∂l
)
> 0. (A.13)
For p ≤ 1. Taking derivative of U1 with respect to l,
∂U0(l, 1; z
∗)
∂l
= (λx∗H + (1− λ)) (−(1− c)z∗) + (λl + (1− λ))
r¯
2
+ λ
1− c
p
z∗(1− l)x∗H
∂U0(l, 0; z
∗)
∂l
= (λx∗L + (1− λ)) (−z∗) + (λl + (1− λ)) r¯
+ λ
z∗
p
(1− l)x∗L.
Then the difference
∂U0(l, 1; z
∗)
∂l
− ∂U0(l, 0; z
∗)
∂l
= (λl + (1− λ)) (cz∗ − 1
2
r¯)
+ (
1
p
− 1)(1− l)λz∗ ((1− c)x∗H − x∗L)
It is positive when
λ <
cz∗ − 1
2
r¯
(1− l)
(
(cz∗ − 1
2
r¯) + (1
p
− 1)z∗(x∗L − (1− c)x∗H)
) = λ∗
2λ satisfies that λ < 1
1+ 12p˜
, where p˜ is given in the basic model.
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Because xL − (1− c)xH < cp, for
λ <
cz∗ − 1
2
r¯
(1− l) ((cz∗ − 1
2
r¯) + (1− p)cz∗) < λ∗,
we have
∂z∗
∂l
> 0.
For p > 1. Taking derivative of U1 with respect to l,
∂U0(l, 1; z
∗)
∂l
=− (1− c)z∗ + (λl + (1− λ)) r¯
2
+ λ
1− c
p
z∗(1− l)
∂U0(l, 1; z
∗)
∂l
=− z∗ + (λl + (1− λ)) r¯ + λz
∗
p
(1− l).
Then the difference
∂U0(l, 1; z
∗)
∂l
− ∂U0(l, 0; z
∗)
∂l
= (λl + (1− λ)) (cz∗ − 1
2
r¯) + (1− 1
p
)(1− l)λcz∗
>0
Immediately, we have
∂z∗
∂l
> 0.
A.11 Proof of Proposition 8 (Optimal Liquidity Holding)
proof
∂
∂l
U0(l, 1; z) =λ
(
−(1− c)zxH,e + 1
2
lr¯ +
(1− c)z
p
(xH,e − l)
)
+ (1− λ)(−(1− c)z + 1
2
r¯)
∂
∂l
U0(l, 0; z) =λ
(
−zxL,e + lr¯ + z
p
(xL,e − l)
)
+ (1− λ)(−z + r¯)
(i) For p > 1, xH,e = xL,e = 1. Both
∂
∂l
U0(l, 1; z) and
∂
∂l
U0(l, 0; z) are negative for all
z. So the first derivative for the expected payoff is negative. It is optimal for banks
to hold zero liquidity. l∗ = 0.
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(ii) For p ≤ 1, xL,e < xH,e < 1.
∂2
∂l2
U0(l, 1; z) =λ
(
−(1− c)z∂xH,e
∂l
+
1
2
r¯ − (1− c)z
p
xH
)
=λ
(
−(1− c)z + 1
2
r¯ − (1
p
− 1)(1− c)zxH
)
<0
Similarly,
∂2
∂l2
U0(l, 0; z) =λ
(
−z∂xL,e
∂l
+ r¯ − z
p
xL
)
=λ
(
−z + r¯ − (1
p
− 1)zxL
)
<0
So the first derivative of U0 is decreasing in l. At l = 0,
∂U0(l, 1; z)
∂l
=
(
λ(
1
p
− 1)xH − (1− λ)
)
(1− c)z + (1− λ)1
2
r¯
It is negative when λ <
z− 1
2(1−c)r¯
z− 1
2(1−c) r¯+(
1
p
−1)xHz .
∂U0(l, 0; z)
∂l
=
(
λ(
1
p
− 1)xL − (1− λ)
)
z + (1− λ)r¯.
It is negative when λ < z−r¯
z−r¯+( 1
p
−1)xLz .
The optimal liquidity holding can be positive, l∗ > 0 if λ is large and p is small.
Note that when l = 1, the bank always defaults. So the optimal liquidity holding is
bounded above, l∗ < 1.
When λ is sufficiently small, l∗ = 0 for all p.
A.12 Proof of Lemma 6
The effect of liquidity regulation on risk-taking z∗:
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Taking derivative of z∗ with respect to κ,
∂z∗
∂κ
= −
∂U0(l(κ),1;z∗)
∂κ
− ∂U0(l(κ),0;z∗)
∂κ
∂U0(l(κ),1;z∗)
∂z
− ∂U0(l(κ),0;z∗)
∂z
. (A.14)
Similar to the previous proof,
∂z∗
∂κ
(
∂U0(l(κ), 1; z
∗)
∂κ
− ∂U0(l(κ), 0; z
∗)
∂κ
)
> 0.
where
∂U0(l(κ), 1; z
∗)
∂κ
− ∂U0(l(κ), 0; z
∗)
∂κ
=
(
∂U0(l(κ), 1; z
∗)
∂l
− ∂U0(l(κ), 0; z
∗)
∂l
)
∂l(κ)
∂κ
+
(
∂U0(l(κ), 1; z
∗)
∂R∗
− ∂U0(l(κ), 0; z
∗)
∂R∗
)
∂R∗
∂l
∂l(κ)
∂κ
.
(A.15)
With λ sufficiently low, the liquidity requirement always has binding power,
∂l(κ)
∂κ
= 1.
A.13 Proof
For p > 1, there is no defaults induced by liquidity shortage. The illiquidity risk is
zero. So the liquid asset holdings do not affect the credit risk, or R∗.
∂R∗
∂l
= 0.
So as proved in Lemma 4,
∂U0(l(κ), 1; z
∗)
∂κ
− ∂U0(l(κ), 0; z
∗)
∂κ
=
∂U0(l(κ), 1; z
∗)
∂l
− ∂U0(l(κ), 0; z
∗)
∂l
> 0 (A.16)
Therefore, z∗ is increasing in κ.
Appendix B
Chapter II: The Impact of Uncertainty
Shocks on the Firm’s Customer Base
B.1 Empirical Finds on Customer Base Investment Results
The following table summarizes the regression results when advertisement expenditure
is scaled by total assets, i.e., xit = log[e/K]it.
Table B.1: Effects of Idiosyncratic Uncertainty on Customer Capital
Investments with Different Customer Base
(1) (2) (3)
log σit -0.147 -0.164 -0.116
(-3.30) (-3.39) (-2.42)
log[e/K]i,t−1 0.759 0.825 0.826
(34.37) (40.59) (39.60)
log[Y/K]it 0.306
(16.63)
logQi,t−1 0.0515
(3.53)
log[Π/K]it 0.147
(6.32)
Observations 31673 31577 30969
t statistics in parentheses
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